FBIS-SOV-87-068
Thursday
9 April 1987
Vol III No 068

Daily Report

SOVIET UNION

SPECIAL CONSUMER NOTICE
PRINTED INSIDE COVER

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTICE

On 1 June 1987 FBIS will begin publication of reorganized and renamed DAILY REPORTS. The following list details the changes being made in the eight volumes.

I.	CHINA DAILY REPORT	Contents unchanged
II.	EASTERN EUROPE DAILY REPORT	Contents unchanged
III.	SOVIET UNION DAILY REPORT	Contents unchanged
IV.	EAST ASIA DAILY REPORT	Renamed; formerly ASIA & PACIFIC DAILY REPORT; contents unchanged
V.	NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA DAILY REPORT	Renamed; formerly MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA DAILY REPORT; contents include: Middle East & South Asia Review Inter-Arab Affairs Islamic Affairs Palestinian Affairs OPEC Affairs South Asian Regional Affairs Arab Africa Algeria Chad Egypt Libya Mauritania Morocco Sudan Tunisia Western Sahara Arabian Peninsula Bahrain Kuwait Oman PDRY Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates Yemen Arab Republic Iraq Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria South Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh India Iran Maldives Nepal & Bhutan Pakistan Sri Lanka
VI.	LATIN AMERICA DAILY REPORT	Contents unchanged

(continued on back of report)

FBIS DAILY REPORT
CONTENTS
Soviet Union

Vol III No 068 9 April 1987

USSR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

- Karpov on 'Stumbling Block' to INF Accord [MOSCOW NEWS 5 Apr] AA 1
- U.S. Plans Early Deployment of Star Wars Systems AA 2

WORLD & REGIONAL ISSUES

- Petrovskiy 8 Apr Foreign Ministry News Conference CC 1
  - Reagan's Remarks 'Hostile' CC 1
  - 'Indignation' at Spy Charges [AFP] CC 1
  - Significance of Shultz Visit CC 2
  - Afghan Settlement CC 2
  - Mideast Settlement CC 3
  - Chernobyl Decontamination Work CC 3
  - World Security Issues Dialogue CC 4
  - Need for International Dialogue CC 7
- Gerasimov Holds Foreign Ministry News Conference CC 8
  - Gorbachev Visit, Other Issues CC 8
  - Hopes for Shultz Talks CC 9
  - FRG's Genscher Interview CC 9
  - No Change in Nuclear Blasts CC 10
  - U.S. Presence in Persian Gulf CC 10
  - France's 'Anti-Soviet Campaign' CC 11
  - Varigina-Verdier Interrogation CC 12
- 'Studio 9,' FRG Group on European Security Issues [Zorin, Schmidt, Bahr, Ruehe, Ruehl, Falin, Zhurkin] CC 13
- Sci-Tech Talks at CSCE 'Very Productive' CC 29

UNITED STATES & CANADA

- TASS on U.S. 'Spy Scare' Campaign, Shultz Visit A 1
- Shultz Holds News Conference Before Visit A 1
- Embassy Espionage Claims 'Absolutely Groundless' [Radio Peace and Progress] A 2
- Senate Holds Hearings on Appointment of CIA Director A 3

SOUTH ASIA

- TASS Says U.S. Not Interested in Peace in DRA [Valeriy, Vavilov] D 1
- Paper Cites Najibullah on DRA Policy Objectives [SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 8 Apr] D 2
- DRA Refugees Return Despite Obstacles, Repression [Krotov in IZVESTIYA 5 Apr] D 2
  - Rebels Blocking Return D 3

Gorbachev Greets Sri Lanka's Silva on Reelection [PRAVDA 8 Apr] D 4
CPSU Sends Greetings to Bangladesh CP Congress [PRAVDA 7 Apr] D 4

WESTERN EUROPE

Space Administration Head Denies Ariane Interest G 1
Charikov Comments on 'Spy Mania' in France, U.S. G 1
Foreign Ministry's Kovalev on Consular Criticism [IZVESTIYA 14 Mar] G 3
French AWACS Deal Part of Closer Ties With NATO [Kovalenko in IZVESTIYA 1 Apr] G 3
Bogachev Questions French Disarmament Stance G 5
French Socialist Party Divisions as Congress Opens [Bolshakov in PRAVDA 4 Apr] G 5
  Socialist Congress Ends [Bolshakov in PRAVDA 6 Apr] G 6
UK TU Delegation Ends Visit; Chernobyl Comments [TRUD 7 Apr] G 7
Antonov, FRG's Bangemann Discuss Economic Ties [PRAVDA 4 Apr] G 8
FRG Banker Interviewed on USSR Trade Prospects [SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 3 Apr] G 8
Razumovskiy Attends Austrian Communists Congress G 9
  Seen off at Airport G 9
  Arrival in Vienna G 10
  Activities in Austria [PRAVDA 1 Apr] G 10
  CPSU CC Greetings [PRAVDA 27 Mar] G 11
  Razumovskiy Addresses Congress [PRAVDA 29 Mar] G 11
  Austrian CP Congress Ends [PRAVDA 30 Mar] G 14
  Razumovskiy Departs Vienna G 15
Correction to TASS Report on French Spy Satellite G 15

USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS

POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Yeltsin Addresses Moscow City Soviet 14 March [MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 15 Mar] R 1
  Gorkom Replaces Personnel [MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 15 Mar] R 9
Kolbin Urges Prosecutors To Monitor Party Leaders [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 24 Mar] R 11
PRAVDA on Estonian Central Committee Plenum [Shirokov, 2 Apr] R 15

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Official Interviewed on State Acceptance Progress [SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 10 Mar] S 1

SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

Kvant Module Docked; Link-Up 'Not Complete' U 1
'Intercosmos' Program Viewed at News Conference U 1

KARPOV ON 'STUMBLING BLOCK' TO INF ACCORD

PM081011 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 14, 5 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Simonov: "Do Americans Know How To Count Money?" under the rubric "The World on My Personal Computer"]

[Text] It is about eight years since I last lectured at Moscow's Polytechnical Museum. After an hour at the rostrum last Wednesday, I came to the conclusion that today's audience resembles that of eight years ago as much as Burda Moden do the garments sold at GUM (the State Department Store).

In the late 70s, as an international analyst I was snowed under with questions about our home affairs. "Why should you focus so much on world imperialism? You'd do better tell us what's happening in this country!"

Today, this information hunger is satisfied by the press and television. At the same time, people feel it in their bones that a historic breakthrough is about to be achieved in international affairs. The nuclear-free age seems to be within easy reach, at an arm's length, so to speak, although it must take two arms - those of the Soviet and American leaders - to sign the treaty on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

The notes I received from my audience at the Polytechnical Museum all focussed on that issue. It was an avalanche of notes, whose authors, for the most part, strove to understand why the United States treats its own "zero option" as a mother disowning her own baby. "Why should we be surprised about it, though, one of the notes written on a piece of checkered paper read, "seeing that the Pershings are already deployed and Americans are very good at counting their money?"

After returning from the public lecture, I rang up Viktor Karpov, the Chief of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Department in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who took the trouble to give MN the following exclusive interview.

[MN] "What happened in Geneva before the Soviet and American negotiators adjourned till April 23? What are the results of the round recently finished? Have you begun wording the future treaty?"

[Karpov] "What matters is not so much whether or not the sides have got down to work, as what their positions are. Many serious obstacles have remained in this area. The stumbling-block lying on the road to successful negotiations is so big that we cannot just go round it. We must get rid of it. Otherwise it may happen that while formally signing the medium-range missiles elimination agreement, the United States will preserve the same missiles under a changed name. Instead of eliminating them, Americans are trying to transfer them to another category and so keep them. Of course, this is not the variant that can promote our cause.

"By 'another category' I mean the proposed conversion of the Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1Bs and keeping them in Europe as battlefield-tactical weapons. As a matter of fact, this leaves the US military a chance of easily reconverting them back into Pershing-2s, because Pershing-1Bs is nothing but the first stage of the Pershing-2s. The second stage can be delivered and mounted in its original place at a very short notice. What sort of disarmament is this? We propose to scrap all medium-range missiles. Americans do not intend to eliminate cruise missiles either. All they are prepared to do is to make them sea-based."

[MN] "What about the verification issue? What does the United States propose in this area?"

[Karpov] "They don't seem to be seriously interested in verification. All they want to do is talk about it. If we analyze their position closely, we can see that far from all US bases in Europe will be subject to control. Therefore, the question of blocking every channel for getting round the treaty's obligations is all important."

[MN] "The Americans allege that the Soviet side has departed from the Reykjavik accord to discuss medium-range missiles together with the battle-field-tactical weapons. Is this true?

[Karpov] "As a matter of fact, we have never refused to discuss these issues. But we have consistently argued against shifting medium-range missiles from one 'package' to another. It is the shifting that we object to. As to whether or not the problem of battlefield-tactical weapons should be resolved, there can be no question about it. We are prepared to continue negotiating with the American side to reduce and eventually eliminate these weapons. The artificial linkage is apparently designed to hinder a medium-range missile agreement."

As I rang off, the note I received at the Polytechnical Museum came to mind again. Of course, Americans know how to count money. Those belonging to the military-industrial complex believe medium-range missiles to be a sure investment, and are in no hurry to get rid of them.

U.S. PLANS EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF STAR WARS SYSTEMS

LD081323 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 8 TASS -- The Reagan administration is secretly making plans for an early deployment of land- and space-based components for "Star Wars" systems, according to a study conducted by the U.S. Senate and circulated here today.

The report prepared by Senator Bennett Johnston and Senator William Proxmire, a member of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, said that the U.S. Department of Defense had a special program for the deployment of ABM components under the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative." The existence of such a program had not been announced officially.

In a statement circulated together with the report Senator Johnston emphasized that administration's plans to deploy SDI as soon as possible were absurd and very dangerous.

Such plans would undermine the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty and project the nuclear arms race to space, the statement said.

Senator Proxmire in his turn pointed out that the Reagan administration's plans for an early deployment of components for "Star Wars" systems were purely politically motivated. President Reagan is evidently striving for the realization of SDI before he retires in 1989 and, by doing so, is trying to make the United States continue work under that program in the future.

PETROVSKIY 8 APR FOREIGN MINISTRY NEWS CONFERENCE

Reagan's Remarks 'Hostile'

LD080901 Moscow TASS in English 0848 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- Hostile remarks made by President Reagan concerning the Soviet Union Tuesday cannot but cause indignation and regret among us, said Vladimir Petrovskiy, a deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R. He spoke at a news conference in Moscow today.

It can hardly be considered an accident that such a crucial moment, when preparations are nearing completion for the visit of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to Moscow, was chosen for yesterday's series of anti-Soviet pronouncements. It is an open secret that objective prerequisites are taking shape for headway in resolving the issues which determine Soviet-American relations and for reaching accords in the key area of security, accords which all nations are awaiting from us.

It appears that some people in Washington are displeased with such a prospect, Vladimir Petrovskiy went on to say. So, they are working up psychosis in a bid to poison the atmosphere in which Soviet-American talks are to be held.

Such actions have already become a characteristic feature of Washington's behavior. Such unworthy tricks are used each time when some serious business is to be done. However, I would like to express the hope that the American side will have enough dignity and responsibility to deal with security issues at long last, and to do so in real earnest, so as to find a mutually acceptable solution to them, said the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R.

'Indignation' at Spy Charges

AU080945 Paris AFP in English 0935 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, April 8 (AFP) -- A deputy Soviet foreign minister, Vladimir Petrovskiy, said here on Wednesday that current U.S. allegations of Soviet spying at the U.S. Embassy here are an attempt to block "movement in key areas" of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Recalling next week's scheduled visit here by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, Mr. Petrovskiy told a news conference that "the time chosen" by Washington to make the allegations was "certainly no accident."

"Objective conditions" exist now "for movement in key areas for U.S.-Soviet relations," Mr. Petrovskiy said. "It appears that someone in Washington does not like this process and is trying to poison the atmosphere."

He voiced hope, however, that "the United States will be sufficiently dignified and responsible to face reality."

Mr. Petrovskiy said the Soviet Union had received statements by President Ronald Reagan about bugging of a new U.S. Embassy building under construction here with "indignation and regret."

Mr. Reagan's said on Tuesday that U.S. personnel would not move to the building until it was proven security-tight and that the Soviet Embassy here would not be allowed to move to its new headquarters until then.

So much eavesdropping equipment was cemented into the new U.S. Embassy walls building here that Washington was envisaging tearing it down and building another one, Mr. Reagan said.

Mr. Petrovskiy said Mr. Reagan's statements were "really hostile to the Soviet Union."

He dismissed as "inventions" the U.S. allegations that Soviet intelligence agents had been allowed into the current embassy compound by U.S. Marine Corps security guards who were having affairs with Soviet women.

Mr. Petrovskiy also told foreign correspondents here that "concrete evidence" of U.S. spying in the Soviet Union would be provided at a briefing on Thursday, and invited them to look into "the activities" of U.S. special services here.

Significance of Shultz Visit

LD081033 Moscow TASS in English 1020 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- We are getting ready for the visit of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to the Soviet Union with entire responsibility and attach great importance to it, said Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R. He spoke at a news conference for Soviet and foreign media people in Moscow today.

Our proposals for arms limitation and disarmament, primarily as regards its main, nuclear and space, direction are well-known to the American side. We hope that this time the U.S. representative will not be empty-handed when he comes to Moscow. It is important that the visit proceed in an adequate situation and that all kinds of propaganda campaigns not poison the atmosphere in the run-up to the visit. The visit is of major significance and a corresponding attitude to it is required on the part of all those who are related to it, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R. emphasized.

Afghan Settlement

LD080955 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0855 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 8 Apr (TASS) -- Anti-Soviet concoctions continue to represent one of the main directions of the activities of Western propaganda, said Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, at a news conference held here today. He was responding to a question concerning Western press concoctions alleging that one of the Soviet representatives taking part in a seminar held at Columbia University supposedly called the introduction of the Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 a mistake on the USSR's part.

A concoction of this kind, said the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman, does not even deserve to be refuted. However, in view of the fact that this question is constantly being peddled on the pages of Western press, one would like to voice the following views.

First and foremost, it is beyond doubt that the introduction of our limited military contingent into Afghanistan in 1979 at the request of that country's legitimate government was at the time caused by a pressing, objective need, since the armed interference from outside the DRA's affairs assumed proportions that threatened the independence and sovereignty of a friendly neighboring country.

Our leadership already has stated repeatedly, and I can repeat again, that the USSR is in favor of the speediest and most equitable settlement possible of the Afghan problem. Certain circles in the West are attempting to boil the solution to this problem down to merely the withdrawal of Soviet troops. This is a hopeless venture. The armed interference from outside the DRA's affairs was and is at the source of the Afghan problem.

Voices can be heard in a number of Western countries against national reconciliation in Afghanistan; attempts even are being made to wreck it. But I think that it is not these forces that will determine Afghanistan's future. It is the Afghan people itself that will arrive at the solutions -- and the absolute majority of those people support the reconciliation course.

The USSR, emphasized the deputy USSR foreign minister, fully supports the DRA Government's national reconciliation policy as the most realistic path toward establishing peace and calm in Afghanistan, toward ensuring that country's development as a sovereign and nonaligned state.

Mideast Settlement

LD081041 Moscow TASS in English 1022 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- The Soviet Union regards a settlement of crisis and conflict situations through peaceful means as an important avenue in forming an all-embracing international security system, Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, said here today at a press conference. In this context, he said, of great importance is the question on a Mid-East settlement, in an area which has become a source of permanent tension. "Therefore, we made a proposal of getting down to practical work on a peaceful settlememt and activating a preparatory mechanism to hold an international conference on a Mid-East settlement."

"Our idea is to set up a preparatory committee made up of permanent Security Council members even today, without shelving a settlement. It would take up organizational work on calling an international conference," said the representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry. He pointed out that the idea enjoyed support of most countries, except the USA and Israel.

Chernobyl Decontamination Work

LD081026 Moscow TASS in English 1012 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- There are no grounds for anxiety and worry over the situation at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told a press conference here today.

Addressing Soviet and foreign newsmen, he said that water in the reservoir adjoining the nuclear power facility was absolutely normal.

Decontamination was continuing at the station, and repair and restoration work was under way at Unit No 3.

Admission of visitors to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant had not been stopped, but only restricted due to spring floods and restoration work there, said the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman.

World Security Issues Dialogue

LD090553 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1910 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Report on 8 April USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry Press Center news conference entitled: "On Dialogue Regarding the Creation of a Universal System of International Security," with B.P. Pyadyshev, deputy head of the information directorate of the Foreign Ministry, presiding, and V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, V.I. Goldanskiy, and CH. T. Aytmatov; replacing "World Today" program -- recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified reporter, over video of interior of Press Center] In Moscow a news conference on the theme of dialogue regarding the creation of a universal system of international security has taken place. It was opened by Comrade Pyadyshev, deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Comrade Petovskiy, deputy USSR foreign minister, addressed the journalists. [video shows four officials on platform, identified by nameplates, are, from left: V.I. Goldanskiy, V.F. Petrovskiy, B.P. Pyadyshev, and Ch.To. Aytmatov].

[Petrovskiy] The first months of 1987 have been crammed with major international meetings, forums, and talks. Of course, each meeting is important and specific in itself, in the overall political sense: A multi-level dialogue on questions of ensuring security that is equal to all, and, first and foremost, away from the central military-political trend, is being developed and is gaining strength.

Generally speaking, this is not surprising, insofar as a solution to the most important task of our times -- the survival of mankind -- depends on the state of affairs in the area of disarmament.

Dialogue on security issues has assumed a systematic nature. It is now taking place, in essence, on various levels, and it encompasses various areas. All the bilateral and multilateral talks in progress on limiting armaments and disarmaments, all efforts to improve and develop political, economic, and humanitarian relations between states, and all actions aimed at settling regional conflicts, the development of the European process, and the appearance of the first elements of a similar process in the Asian and Pacific region, in the Mediterranean region, and elsewhere -- all these, in the final analysis, go to make up general dialogue among states about the building of a world in which all will be secure.

A new political thinking is being shaped in the process of such dialogue. Practical ways of conducting international relations in accordance with the realities of the nuclear-space age are being determined.

It is well known that the 27th CPSU Congress gave a powerful impetus to broad discussion in the world arena on the problem of comprehensive, universal security.

The Soviet Union proposed a fundamental basis for a future system of such security, the general guidelines for a nuclear-free world, as well as a unique methodological approach: the renunciation of military-technical resolutions, in favor of political solutions, and a quest for such solutions by joint efforts. The establishment of a system of a nuclear-free and coercion-free world, and the development and deepening of constructive dialogue to this end is the principled course of the Soviet state, the origins of which go back to 1917.

At that time, 70 years ago, in its first legislative act, the Decree on Peace, the Soviet state, which had only just come into being, set forth the concept of a just and democratic peace that was radical for its time. Today, too, our country is setting forth a philosophy of security which is revolutionary in its nature. It is proposing to make peaceful coexistence the supreme, universal principle of international relations.

Then, in October 1917, Soviet Russia pointed to a way out of the world war unleashed by the imperialists. Today the Soviet Union, demonstrating its new thinking, is setting forth a program to rid mankind of nuclear, chemical, and any other threat of destruction. Like the Decree on Peace, our program of security for all is addressed not only to governments, but also to peoples. Our participation in the dialogue on all-round, universal security is backed up by specific deeds and practical measures. This is once again illustrated by the Soviet Union's proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe, which makes possible a move toward nuclear disarmament.

At the same time, it is necessary, of course, to take account of the fact that productive dialogue on security issues has its own inner logic. It presupposes movement of the partners closer together. As for the Soviet Union, it is ready, and, as you see, is proceeding along its part of that road.

By putting forward the goal of developing wide-scale dialogue on problems of security, the Soviet Union notes with satisfaction that ideas of security are beginning to enter the practice of world politics. Reykjavik outlined the contours of a world free from the fear of nuclear annihilation. The Stockholm accords on confidence-building measures in Europe, the Vienna conventions on the safety of peaceful development of nuclear-power engineering, and the Delhi declaration signed at the end of last year by the Soviet and Indian leaders, bear the stamp of the new thinking. The Soviet Union starts with the premise that dialogue should develop in breadth and depth.

[Pyadyshev] The NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY correspondent has a question for Comrade Aytmatov: The Issyk-kul forum made a major contribution to uniting cultural figures for peace and against the nuclear threat. What are Soviet writers and cultural figures planning to do to continue these efforts? Over to you, Chingiz Tarikovich.

[Aytmatov] I believe that our Issyk-kul forum also had a part, to a degree, in the establishment of this system of thinking, and fostering dialogue and exchanges of views on the most topical and burning issues affecting various societies' and various social systems, and our shared human culture, our spiritual potential. Our motto, "Survival Through Creativity," includes much. It includes everything that might assist people make sense of and become aware of themselves, both as individuals of the 20th century and as people responsible for the general state of the world.

I would like to say that all our reflections and discussions had a definite historic target, against which we measured, as it were, all our dreams and our resolve: the portals of a new century, the 21st century, and a new millenium, the 3d millenium.

We intend to continue our meetings in the future, to give them a more or less regular nature, so to speak, and to discuss each time at our meetings all the things that worry us at that moment; all that we deem it vital and necessary to discuss in the interests of the development of the culture of all mankind, and of the humanitarian spirit of all mankind.

[Pyadyshev] A question from the correspondent of the Japanese paper ASAHI for Academician Goldanskiy: Isn't the idea of a nuclear-free world utopian?

[Goldanskiy] I should like to stress that we understand nuclear-free world to mean a world free of nuclear weapons, but in no sense a world free of nuclear power. Of course, the building of a nuclear-free world is an extremely complex task. Here we do not make light of the difficulties, but we think that mankind has no alternative path to take. The conditions for the establishment of a nuclear-free world will be forged during the process of their constuction. [sentence as heard] Here one has to consider a ban on nuclear weapons. The very process of nuclear disarmament, and knowledge of nuclear weapons and nuclear power-engineering will be required, if only to use the 50,000 or 60,000 warheads already stockpiled for power-engineering purposes, to convert nuclear explosives into nuclear fuel, i.e. to beat swords into plowshares, in the most literal sense. In principle, that amount is enough for 200 power sets with a capacity of 20 million kw.

Here it seems to me there is very great scope for international scientific cooperation.

[Pyadyshev] Yes please, your question.

[Trofimova] Olga Trofimova, APN observer. Vladimir Fedorovich, you spoke of international dialogue as a school of cooperation and joint creativity. In that light, could you say a few words about the reaction of the West to the proposal by Czechoslovakia and the GDR to establish a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe? Thank you.

[Petrovskiy] I believe you have asked a very important and truly interesting question. In the process of fruitful dialogue, talks about the proposal by the GDR and Czechoslovakia to establish a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe would be of great significance. This would be of great importance from the standpoint of reducing military confrontation and improving the general situation on the European Continent. But alas, thus far this proposal has not met with any response from those to whom it was addressed.

Generally speaking, I have to say that in international relations a rather strange situation has been developing recently. Sometimes a certain proposal is set forth, nurtured by various people, including sober-minded representatives of the West.

This happened with the idea of this corridor, an idea which in its original form was put forward by Sweden. When this proposal became an official proposal by the socialist states, however, for some reason a blind eye was turned to it.

Incidentally, the same thing happened with the theme we are discussing today. After all, the idea of international dialogue on world security, equal security for all, was first formulated by the Palme commission, which included, you will recall, prominent figures of state from the United States, Sweden, Norway, and many other countries.

As soon as we proposed dialogue, an exchange of views on this issue, some of those who were present at the conception of this proposal, have now begun to renounce it. In this I see a sort of relapse of the logic of the days of confrontation, when some people do not even bother to look and see what a given proposal contains, and what the idea in it is.

[Pyadyshev] A question for Comrade Petrovskiy from the correspondent for the West German paper DIE WAHRHEIT: What is the news from Chernobyl? Are journalists able to visit it? What can you tell us about the coming visit to Moscow by George Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state? Over to you, Vladimir Fedorovich.

[Petrovskiy] I must assure all journalists, and I have spoken to the competent organizations, that there are no grounds for anxiety or worry. I have been told that the water is in an absolutely normal state. There are no grounds for concern. I must also report that admission of visitors to Chernobyl AES has not been stopped, but merely restricted.

As to your second question, the question regarding the coming arrival in Moscow of Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state, we are getting ready for the forthcoming visit of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to the Soviet Union with all responsibility and attach great importance to it.

Our proposals for arms limitation and disarmament, primarily as regards its main, nuclear and space, direction are well-known to the U.S. side. We hope that this time the U.S. representative will not be empty-handed when he comes to Moscow. It is important that the visit proceed in an appropriate atmosphere and that all kinds of propaganda campaigns not poison the atmosphere in the run-up to the visit. The visit is of major significance and a corresponding attitude to it is required on the part of all those who are related to it.

[Reporter] Replies to other questions from correspondents were also given.

Need for International Dialogue

LD080915 Moscow TASS in English 0900 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- A new mode of political thinking is being shaped and practical ways are being defined to make international relations match the realities of the nuclear-space age at the current dialogue on security issues, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told a press conference here today.

The USSR's course towards transforming international relations on a new democratic, humanistic basis to ensure genuine security for all stemmed from the policy of restructuring and more democracy that was being pursued inside the country, the Soviet spokesman said.

Responsibility to peoples demanded that governments realize organic unity between internal and foreign policy and growing interrelationship between states and peoples.

"In our approach to the dialogue on comprehensive, universal security, we do not claim a monopoly on truth," Petrovskiy said. "It demands a search, honest efforts by each and every one. That is precisely why the Soviet Union regards international dialogue as a school of cooperation and joint construction, including for ourselves, as a school of political interaction the lack of which has been making itself felt."

"The USSR will consistently follow a line towards achieving practical results. Our participation in the dialogue on comprehensive, universal security is corroborated by specific deeds, by practical measures," said the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman.

"This is also evidenced by the Soviet Union's proposal for eliminating medium-range missiles from Europe, a proposal that helps to embark on the path of nuclear disarmament."

A resultative dialogue on security issues provided for partners' movement towards one another, Petrovskiy said. As to the Soviet Union, it was ready to, and was marching along its part of the way.

By putting forward the goal of developing a broad-scale dialogue on security problems, the Soviet Union noted with satisfaction that the ideas of security were beginning to enter the practice of world politics.

Reykjavik outlined a world free from the fear of nuclear annihilation, he observed. The Stockholm accords on confidence-building measures in Europe, the Vienna conventions on safety of nuclear engineering and the Delhi declaration signed by the Indian and Soviet leaders last year were marked by the new mentality.

The Soviet Union believed that the dialogue should be made broader and deeper.

"We reckon that not only governments, but also the general public and mass media will contribute to developing the dialogue and ultimately shaping such a comprehensive security system that would match the present-day realities and meet the interests of the whole of mankind," Petrovskiy said.

GERASIMOV HOLDS FOREIGN MINISTRY NEWS CONFERENCE

Gorbachev Visit, Other Issues

LD071617 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] There was a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists dedicated to current issues of international politics at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center today.

The visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to Czechoslovakia is to take place in the second half of this week, said Gerasimov, head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Department, in reply to questions from correspondents.

Describing the groundless action of the French authorities in demanding the departure from the country of a number of Soviet officials, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman stressed that the Soviet side qualified these actions as frankly unfriendly, bearing a clearly expressed political nature with the obvious intention of poisoning the atmosphere of Soviet-French relations, sowing mistrust of the Soviet people and impeding the growth of positive interest in the Soviet Union among the French people. The scandalous Varigina Verdier-case demonstrates the unceremonious attitude in France to Soviet people. Direct threats, blackmail, and crude pressure were used in the interrogation of the Soviet citizen.

Attention has been drawn in the Soviet Union to an interview by FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher in which he advocated an agreement on medium-range missiles. We see the minister's words, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman noted, as a desire on the part of the FRG Government to further the attainment of a decision on medium-range missiles and their elimination.

It was reported at the briefing that in the spring and autumn of 1986 a group of Soviet and American scientists organized the first joint public opinion poll held among adolescents in the USSR and the United States. The adolescents of both countries gave answers that demonstrated the concern of the younger generation with respect to the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

Hopes for Shultz Talks

LD072130 Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] The American state secretary, George Shultz, is to arrive in the Soviet Union on Monday the 13th. In a comment on the talks to be held in the Soviet capital, a spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry, Gennadiy Gerasimov, said the Soviet Union was scrupulously preparing for them. We hope, said the Soviet official, that the Shultz visit will bear positive fruit.

FRG'S Genscher Interview

LD071524 Moscow TASS in English 1453 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 7 TASS -- Attention has been drawn in the Soviet Union to the interview of the FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher who declared in favour of an agreement on medium-range missiles, said Gennadiy Gerasimov, a representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry, today.

The keynote of the FRG foreign minister's interview was that conclusion of such an agreement would fully accord with NATO's aims which were earlier formulated in its "dual-track decision." Having taken that decision, the minister recalled, they stated in the West that "additional armament" might become unnecessary if Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles are removed.

It should be added to the minister's words that there is now such an opportunity, said Gennadiy Gerasimov at a briefing at the Foreign Ministry's Press Centre. The Soviet Union is ready to remove from Europe its medium-range nuclear systems. It is now for the West to have its say.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher said that his country was interested to see the USSR and USA to take obligations concerning subsequent negotiations on operational-tactical missiles and on questions pertaining to the correlation of forces in the sphere of conventional armaments. It is clear from his pronouncements that he was against plans of conversion of Pershing-2 missiles deployed on the FRG's territory, thereby declining the idea of NATO's new "additional armament," this time with operational-tactical missiles.

We view Hans-Dietrich Genscher's statement as the desire of the FRG Government to further "the zero option" on medium-range missiles, said the representative of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR. It is also essential that the minister's considerations on ways of reaching this goal are largely in tune with our notions on how Europe could be rid of the nuclear weapons' burden. It is to be hoped that in the FRG, and in the West as a whole, they would not confine themselves to words only, but would take concrete constructive steps in line with the Europeans' aspirations, stressed the representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

No Change in Nuclear Blasts

LD071521 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1426 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 7 Apr (TASS) -- THE NEW YORK TIMES reported today that the USSR has allegedly "put aside" its demands for a complete halt to all nuclear tests, (leaving it, it is true, as an ultimate goal) and has instead proposed that the U.S. side come to an agreement on limiting the number and capacity of nuclear explosions, USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said. Speaking here today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists, he pointed out that this report is being put forward as a change in the USSR's position.

In this regard I should like to recall that the USSR's decision to end its unilateral moratorium on any nuclear blasts is a forced responsive measure dictated exclusively by the interests of USSR security and provoked by the present U.S. Administration's reluctance to respond positively to the USSR's appeal for it to join its peace initiative, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said. The USSR's resumption of nuclear blasts does not mean that it has given up the resolute struggle for a complete end to them.

The USSR remains a convinced supporter of the complete termination of all nuclear tests as a most important initial measure in achieving the main goal -- halting the nuclear arms race, and the subsequent total elimination of nuclear arms. As before, the USSR will strive energetically to achieve that goal.

U.S. Presence in Persian Gulf

LD071447 Moscow TASS in English 1431 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 7 TASS -- The Washington administration is expanding the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf area, said spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry Gennadiy Gerasimov. Speaking at a briefing here today he said that panicky reports of the U.S. intelligence services about the deployment by Iran of its missiles on the cost of the Strait of Hormuz had appeared in the U.S. press. An armada of 18 U.S. warships with the Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier has been deployed at the entry into the Gulf. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger issued a directive to step up the presence of the U.S. Navy. All this is being done under the pretext of ensuring an unobstructed supply of oil to Europe and Japan.

The USSR cannot judge how reliable is the information of the U.S. intelligence about Tehran's plans, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said. Iran itself declares officially that it will not take any actions that would hamper shipping in the Persian Gulf. It is apparently above all the United States that needs the heightening of tension in the area. It hopes that by frightening the Persian Gulf countries it will compel them to invite the United States as their defendant. The Soviet Union holds that international shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz must be free and safe.

Being a party to the 1958 and 1982 conventions, which were signed, by the way, by Iran and Iraq, the USSR firmly declares for unswerving implementation of the provisions of these conventions about unobstructed navigation in the world ocean and, specifically, the clauses related to shipping through the straits.

France's 'Anti-Soviet Campaign'

LD071514 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1408 GMT 7 Apr

[Text] Moscow, 7 Apr (TASS) -- A USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative today described the unfriendly action of the French authorities, demanding the departure from France of a number of Soviet representatives, as actions bearing a clearly expressed political nuance, undertaken with the obvious purpose of poisoning the atmosphere of Soviet-French contacts.

Soviet diplomats and workers of other Soviet establishments in France are being depicted by the French media as enemies of this country, Gennadiy Gerasimov said today speaking at a briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center. They are being depicted as spies bent on stealing France's military and other secrets, particularly Ariane rocket technology. As for this technology, the USSR Foreign Ministry representative stressed, according to the estimates of Soviet experts, USSR rocket technology passed that stage long ago.

Our country does not stoop to such insulting representation of French people working in the USSR, and there is no campaign of hostility being conducted against them. We have believed and do believe that the feeling of friendship and respect built up between our peoples over the decades is a valuable investment that is not to be squandered, said Gennadiy Gerasmiov.

Speaking about the arrest of Soviet citizen Lyudmila Verdier by the French secret service, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed that this action shows the extent of the French authorities' unceremonious attitude toward Soviet citizens. Used during Lyudmila Verdier's interrogation were crude pressure, blackmail and direct threats.

Gennadiy Gerasimov said that this case is far from being the only one. He recalled that at present the French authorities are refusing to hand over to their relatives Julieta Konyushenko, daughter of Soviet citizen Grossman who died in France; Louise Delfoss, daughter of Soviet citizen Kireyeva who was killed in France; and also Elias Vakhabbi, son of Soviet citizen Shtetapalova -- all three being minors. [all names as received]

Replying to journalists' questions, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the anti-Soviet campaign in the French mass media and the unfriendly actions of the French authorities are, of course, not facilitating preparations for Jacques Chirac's visit to Moscow. We favor common sense prevailing in the approach to dealing with problems affecting Soviet-French relations, he said. An invitation has been extended to Chirac to visit the USSR, but the precise timing has not yet been agreed.

Varigina-Verdier Interrogation

LD072104 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] [Announcer] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists was held at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center in Moscow today. Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, spoke to those assembled about current questions of international policy. Among other questions, he dwelt on the anti-Soviet campaign which has been unleashed in France. Our press has already reported about the unlawful arrest of the Soviet citizen Varigina-Verdier, who is the wife of the French citizen, Pierre Verdier. Her interrogation lasted for 12 hours without a break. Gennadiy Gerasimov said:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] She was not permitted to get in touch with the Soviet mission. During the interrogation such methods as crude pressure, blackmail, and direct threats were used. For example, she was told that the Soviet Embassy already knew about her arrest, that the embassy had no intention of protecting her, and that if she returned to the Soviet Union she would await torture and Siberia.

Varigina-Verdier spent the night of 17-18 March with drug addicts and prostitutes. She heard the cries of women being raped, cries for help. It is possible that they were being mimicked in order to frighten her. At all events, the night was a hard one, and they taunted her by saying that the secret service people could do whatever they liked to her and no one would ever hear about it. It was only on 2 April -- 17 days after her arrest -- that a representative of the Soviet Embassy was able to meet the Soviet citizen who had been arrested. Since no charges could be made against her, apart from the fact that she was a Soviet citizen and that is hardly a charge, she was released from prison on 3 April with a written understanding that she would not leave the country.

We await the immediate ending of this anti-Soviet farce by the French special services. [end recording]

[Announcer] Soviet scientists (Nikolay Popov) and (Vladimir Andreyenkov) then addressed those present with a report on the results of the joint Soviet-American sociological research work among young people, which was held in the United States and the Soviet Union. The results of this research will be published in the press.

Replies were given to journalists' questions.

'STUDIO 9,' FRG GROUP ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES

OW040817 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0410 GMT 4 Apr 87

["Studio 9" program presented by Professor Valentin Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio, with Helmut Schmidt, former FRG chancellor, Egon Bahr, leading Social Democratic figure and Bundestag member; Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union faction of the ruling party in the FRG Bundestag; Lothar Ruehl, state secretary of the FRG Defense Ministry; Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the APN Board; and Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; German participants speak in German with superimposed translation]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. In our talk today in Studio 9 of the Ostankino television center, we have decided to discuss the problems of the political situation in Europe.

At the invitation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, a group of prominent West German political figures has visited Moscow and we decided to take advantages of their presence to invite them here and ask them to take part in discussing this most important political problem.

I wish to introduce you to our guests: Mr Helmut Schmidt, former FRG chancellor, Egon Bahr, a leading figure in the Social Democratic Party and Bundestag member -- you have had an opportunity to meet him here in Studio 9; Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union [CDU-CSU] faction of the ruling party in the FRG Bundestag; Lothar Ruehl, state secretary of the FRG Defense Ministry; and -- let me introduce the Soviet participants in our broadcast -- Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the APN Board; and Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Recent breakthroughs on the world political arena are perhaps most clearly seen on our old European Continent. A new concept has even appeared in the political dictionary: the European common household. The Soviet proposal to withdraw American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe is an action directed at making this household less dangerous for all its inhabitants. I would like to begin our talk today by posing a question to everyone here, all of the participants, and to ask them to answer it briefly. The question is: Regarding the present situation in Europe, what are you satisfied with and what are you dissatisfied with? We will begin with you, Mr Chancellor.

[Schmidt] The political situation in Europe was better 12 years ago; in 1975, when a conference was held in Helsinki. Then the economic situation of all the European states was not as yet subjected to the damaging effects of the world economic crisis, as is the case today. Nevertheless, I am happy that we now are not living under the fear to imminent war, and the economic situation is better than in the 1950's and 1960's. What I would like to see is greater freedom of travel and contacts for all, both in Western, and Eastern Europe.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehe.

[Ruehe] It is good that there is peace in Europe. It is bad that this peace is preserved by a large number of weapons on both sides. It is bad that Europe remains divided, that in this common household we do not have the opportunity to interact freely. It is good that there are signs that Europeans are not happy to accept this state of affairs and that perhaps talks will reach such a stage that we will return to detente. This would affect every citizen in the Soviet Union and the FRG.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr.

[Bahr] I regret so much that traditional distrust is left over from the days of the cold war. There also is too much prejudice. I would like to see, through better knowledge of each other and wider exchange of information, this situation eliminated and an atmosphere of understanding and trust created.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehl, please.

[Ruehl] I wish to continue with what Mr Ruehe was saying. The level of confrontation between the armed forces in East and West Europe is much too high, much too great. The people of Europe not only can but must, in their common interests, strive for reduction of military forces. A prerequisite to this would be the results of talks to ensure an approximate balance of power. To achieve this, military superiority of one side over the other must be eliminated.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] I am particularly unhappy with the fact that during the past 12 years the number of unresolved problems has increased. What gives me hope is the growing confidence, the growing wish in Europe to find a way out of the present situation, to establish cooperation, to understand each other as we are, both in the East and in the West; and, based on respect for each other's interests, to find ways for more stable, more productive, more reliable in all aspects, cooperation.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich.

[Zhurkin] What I like is that in Europe, perhaps unlike any other place in the world, an infrastructure of talks, attempts to reach agreement on solutions to problems on security, economic, humanitarian, and other areas of cooperation, has developed. What I do not like is that these talks have not as yet led to either side destroying even one missile, one tank, one place, not a single weapon. I am not at all happy with this sad state of dialectics.

[Zorin] I have listened carefully to your replies. Mr Ruehe, I have the impression that your answer contains a note of pessimism. Perhaps I am mistaken. I would like to ask you in relation to this, how do you ideally perceive the European security situation?

[Ruehe] I am not a pessimist. I am a realist. I feel that we need a broadened understanding of security. The problem of disarmament would not exist if there were greater confidence between people. Therefore, the theme of human rights -- greater freedom, more frequent meetings -- is related to missiles and tanks. We cannot achieve the necessary confidence if we do not open the immured doors in Europe. That is why Western Europe is watching with such keen interest developments in the Soviet Union, the process of new thinking, the interesting debates, and discussions. All of this has very important significance. If everything is reduced to tanks and planes, then we will not achieve security and confidence in Europe.

[Falin] I think that this is a somewhat simplistic -- if you will allow me to put it this way -- summary of the problems. If we are to turn to past experiences, then often wars occurred between those countries that did not have problems of freedom of movement, exchange of ideas, and so on. Moreover, even today some of the wars and conflicts are taking place precisely between such countries. That is why to reduce the problems of the arms race and security to a level at which people will simply be able to have free and easy contact with each other, perhaps means avoiding some of the more difficult problems, thus dooming the solution to these problems to prolonged inaction.

Here we should think not only about the compatibility of concepts of rights, freedoms, and so forth, but also about compatibility of philosophies -- state philosophies, and philosophies of military doctrines, and many other things that have not made our lives easy in recent years and decades.

[Zorin] I feel that the open wish and goodwill, which must not be muddied by some aspiration for scoring propaganda points or to take advantage of problems, are also very important. The tasks facing us are too important to think about scoring propaganda points. This is my point of view. Mr Bahr, I have read your statements expressing the idea that it is necessary to create a situation in which -- as the diplomats say -- de facto war in Europe would become impossible. Could you perhaps elaborate on this idea here today?

[Bahr] A situation in central Europe has developed today in which both sides are armed to such an extent that they are afraid of war. No one can say with absolute confidence that these weapons will not be used. I feel that it would be better to begin disarming, to disarm to a certain level where neither side would be in a position to attack the other. This is not limited to atomic weapons only. It concerns conventional weapons as well. This would mean that both sides would remain capable of defending themselves, but not capable of attacking because there would be insufficient weapons for this. Then the strategy will change and we can be sure of security.

[Zorin] Thank you. Mr Chancellor, based on your numerous experiences as defense minister and federal chancellor, could you answer this question: Do you share this point of view or not? Do you see it as a trend at least? To save time I also would like to ask you a second question: What difference do you see in the line implemented by Chancellor Kohl in the area of European politics, and the line which you implemented when you were chancellor of the FRG?

[Schmidt] First, permit me to answer the second question. This answer will not be to the liking of Kohl, nor to my party comrades. I do not see any great difference. As for the first question, the words of my friend Egon Bahr seem too optimistic. He said that both sides should build defenses in such a way that it would be possible to defend oneself, but it would not be possible to attack.

In practice, this is not easy. But I do agree that we should aspire to this. It means that no one would need bombers; they would simply need interceptor aircraft. This does not mean that no one needs tanks, because tanks also are needed for defense. The French could do nothing against Hitler with the Maginot defense line. On this point I am somewhat more skeptical then my friend Egon Bahr, but this is related to the fact that I used to be a defense minister.

In everything else I agree with Mr Ruehe. We spoke of pessimism and optimism. I am for viewing things as they are, without putting on dark glasses of pessimism or rosy glasses of optimism.

[Zorin] A question for you, Mr Ruehe. Chancellor Schmidt does not see any particular difference between the political line of the Kohl government, the government of your party, or the policy pursued by his government. Do you see any difference?

[Ruehe] I am proud of the fact that my country's policy is consistent. Even when it was in the opposition, the CDU-CSU in many ways supported Federal Chancellor Schmidt on such important issues as the security policy. This is why, I repeat, we are pursuing a consistent policy as far as the fundamental points of Western and security policy are concerned, as well as questions concerning Eastern policy and relations between both German states. No breaks have occurred in this and this is good.

I think our neighbors in the West and East should be gratified by the consistency of our policy. Governments change, and although our government is very good, [laughter] nevertheless it will depart at some time and it is important for our neighbors that our policy remain consistent.

[Bahr] I would like to make a brief remark. Naturally I am very happy that the present Federal Government considers good the basis of an agreement against which its leaders spoke out sharply at one time. Herein lies the consistency of policy. I think if the Social Democrats had retained power we would have done all of this better and certain difficulties would not have arisen. But I am very happy that overall everything is proceeding along the path we set.

[Zorin] I understand why today, here in "Studio 9," you are exhibiting more unity among yourselves than sometimes transpires when you are home in Bonn. [laughter] I understand this, but I would like...[indistinct interjections] Well, I have expressed my opinion. Now I would like to ask you, Valentin Mikhaylovich, the same question I asked Mr Chancellor and Mr Ruehe. After all, you were our country's ambassador to the government of Chancellor Schmidt and can judge these comparisons not through books or newspapers but from personal experience. How would you respond to this question?

[Falin] Well the question -- as they say here occasionally -- is interesting, but nevertheless it is a question that is very difficult to answer. It is difficult to answer the question how a policy of detente and a policy of rejecting detente can be correct at the same time. I have in mind the detente policy that the U.S. Administration recognized at one time, and the antidetente policy which the Reagan administration proclaimed when it came to power.

To favor detente is probably somewhat different from opposing detente -- as was the case under the chancellor's...[changes thought halfway through world "chancellor"] as occurs to some extent under the Reagan government -- and at the same time to continue consistently the policy that we have spoken about.

In brief, internal contradictions exist here, they are obvious, and insofar as we are not in the Bundestag or in some kind of unusual situation, we should see them on the Soviet side, we should see them and draw the corresponding conclusions -- as realists, I repeat, not as pessimists.

[Zorin] Perhaps I exaggerate a bit, but I think I will be close to the truth when I say that detente, which played such a great role -- particularly in Europe -- stumbled and found itself frozen when the struggle around the placement of U.S. Pershing missiles on European territory arose. I see that Chancellor Schmidt does not agree with me, but I want to complete the question. Mr Schmidt, I will give you an opportunity to express your opinion, but I want to return to the question: Can the Soviet proposal on intermediate-range missiles become a serious step toward renewing detente? Both political and military detente?

Second, in connection with this, do you not think that precisely this prospect frightens certain circles, particularly those across the ocean?

[Schmidt] I do not share your view that only one reason exists for the fact that the phase of political detente between the West and East ended, unfortunately, during the latter half of the 1970's. Earlier I said that Helsinki was a culminating point. Today we can say that it ended soon after the Helsinki meeting.

There were several reasons. One was the Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles, which did not exist before the second half of the 1970's. The second was the West's reaction to this. Here I must agree with this reaction, and I would like to add that our reaction was inevitable. The third reason was Afghanistan. The fourth was the crisis in Poland, and the fifth reason was the world economic crisis, which in the West destabilizes the political situation more than in Eastern Europe.

Generally, I could say there were numerous reasons, and overall there was an absence of the necessary political strength in Eastern Europe, Moscow, and Western Europe to cope with all of this. We should not heap responsibility for the end of the detente period on one another. We should now talk about how to return to a policy of detente, about whether there is a bridge or path to it.

With regard to this you mention the question of medium-range missiles on both sides. There are Soviet medium-range missiles known as SS-20's and Western ones known as Pershing-2's. Since 1979 I have believed that there should be neither. In 1980 I proposed to Gorbachev's predecessor a zero option for both sides. I made the same proposal in 1981 to Mr Reagan when he visited us. You did not agree to this proposal at the time. Now Gorbachev wants this, but there is no assurance that Reagan does. So let us not blame each other. The Germans, in any case, want to see the missiles on both sides eliminated and want to see short-range [blizhnego radiusa] missiles of both sides removed, and we are right; this would be a path of detente, or at least to the beginning of detente.

But not much time remains, because at the end of this year, 1987, the preelection struggle will begin in the United States, and then it will not be possible to ratify any treaties. Therefore, we have only until the end of 1987. Now if the treaty must be ratified in 1987, then it must be ready no later than October. We have already experienced a situation such as this when the SALT II treaty was concluded, but it was not ratified because the United States was on the eve of a preelection struggle. It has not been ratified to this day, so I ask the Soviet Union and the United States to hurry up.

[Falin] I think the picture we have just seen and heard is not entirely complete, and therefore not quite accurate. The first Soviet SS-20 missiles appeared in 1976, and not at the beginning of the year, I might add. But the appearance of the Soviet SS-20 missile was preceded, as we all recall, by President Ford's statement virtually rejected the policy of detente. At that time, President Ford essentially removed detente, the pursuit of a policy of detente, and made this the aim and one of the slogans of his upcoming presidential election campaign.

Apparently, this was preceded by something else. Apparently this was preceded particulary by U.S. Administration thoughts about the placement of those very Pershing-2's in Western Europe, the decision made not in connection with the SS-20, but was adopted in principle at the end of the 1960's relating to a change in NATO doctrine.

I feel, and I would be prepared to debate this issue with the participants, that the oil crisis of 1973-74 had a very deep effect on the Western approach to the problems of detente, cooperation, and the evaluation of Soviet actions and intentions. It was precisely against the background of another war in the Middle East and the refusal of the United Stated to cooperate with us in the political solution to the questions of this region that the detente crisis began. This developed later; then new circumstances and new reasons were added, but, the beginning, so to speak, of the beginning is related to this moment, to this period.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich, I would like to ask you one question in relation to what Mr Chancellor has been saying about the placement of SS-20 missiles: Was this step a mistake on our part?

[Falin] It is difficult to speak of mistakes. The focal point was using up the stocks of our SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. After the United States had practically refused to consider the qustion of eliminating the medium-range potential, the question invariably arose as to the replacement of old, outdated missiles with new ones. Within the context of the tasks that the old missile potential of the Soviet Union was set to perform and the tasks that the new potential had to cope with, there were no strategic or operational changes. The question of how many missiles would replace the previous ones, how they would be counted -- a missile for a missile or a warhead for a warhead -- is another question altogether. Here we are discussing principles. The need to replace the missiles arose after no solution was found to the main question, I repeat, that of eliminating the nuclear medium-range potential in Europe, because the United States was not ready to consider this zero option on a mutually acceptable basis at the moment.

[Zorin] I see that the state secretary of the Defense Ministry is very anxious to answer Mr Falin. Is that not the case?

[Ruehl] I consider Mr Falin to be mistaken on three points. First, the SS-20 missiles wre not developed in 1976. You began developing this weapon in the beginning of the sixties, and you began testing these missiles at the beginning of 1974. In a discussion similar to the one we are having today with then Federal Chancellor Schmidt, we warned the Soviet participants in the discussion about the placement of these missiles, because it was not merely a simple replacement of antiquated missiles, strategically, it was an increase in the medium-range strike weapon potential, adapted specifically to Western Europe.

Second, we had no medium-range missiles or cruise missiles in Western Europe since 1963. They had been taken out of there. We were hoping that the Soviet Union would not renew this medium-range potential. It was a real shock for us when we found out that this potential was not only being modernized but, with three warheads on each missile, was becoming more powerful. This is what forced Chancellor Schmidt to issue his warnings.

Third, in 1980 we came out with the zero option proposal. We welcome the fact that the Soviet leadership, headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, has now agreed to this proposal. Having consent on this, we can now eliminate these systems on both sides. This is a step forward in the European policies on security. This also would mean progress in American-Soviet relations. It would make a contribution to the cause of limiting East-West conflict and to the cause of detente between the East and the West.

Now we must pay attention to conventional weapons and eliminate Warsaw Pact superiority in Europe, which is particularly burdensome to us. These will be long and difficult talks, requiring intellectual honesty on both sies, as well as goodwill and patience. I think that both sides will rise to the occasion.

[Bahr] I wish to touch on what has just been discussed. First, if the new thinking had appeared 7 or 8 years ago, then there would have been no Pershing or cruise misiles, or SS-20 missiles. Second, one Soviet author during a similar discussion said that we should not be playing ping pong. This means that we should not be exchanging arguments when each one is attempting to make use of his advantages. Such an approach to history will lead us nowhere. We have a new type of thinking. Let us look forward and think: We can now have a zero option. This leads me to my third thought. I hope that we will achieve this zero option.

Helmut Schmidt is absolutely correct. Time is limited. It is running out. I am not sure that we will achieve this solution if after such a package of proposals is opened, the West begins wrapping up another package.

Anticipating opposition in the Bundestag, I welcomed the announcement by the federal chancellor who said: Now the zero option solution for medium range missiles, later, talks on short-range missiles. Here faith in the word of the FRG Government is at stake. I hope that it will not retreat from this position. It is a general position, and it is in the interest of Europe.

[Zorin] Before allowing Vataliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin to have a word, I wish to make only one point. Here we heard the term conventional weapons and Mr Ruehl spoke about the Warsaw Pact superiority in this area. Personally, I belong to those who are in total disagreement with the term conventional weapons. I consider this term to be obsolete.

[Ruehl interrupts] Conventional armed forces.

[Zorin] Speaking about conventional armed forces, and this is tied to conventional weapons, I feel that the term is obsolete first because conventional armed forces are armed today with conventional weapons tht differ little from atomic weapons in their destructive power. Especially, if we speak about Europe, with its density of population and with its number of cities. I wish that our West German colleagues would proceed from the assumption that we in the Soviet Union are not in any way thinking about preserving some sort of superiority in anything, including in conventional weapons. We are speaking about the real reduction of all types of weapons, including those considered to be conventional. Vitality Vladimirovich, please.

[Zhurkin] First I have a brief comment on the question of ping pong about which Mr Ruehl spoke. Even if we are to accept his version that the SS-20's were first tested in 1974, there is now documentary proof that the Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles were first tested in 1969-72. That is before 1974. We also have something to say on the question of Afghanistan and other issues to those who touched on them. But I am in full agreement with Egon Bahr and other West German colleagues who said that there is no need to play ping pong or to look back, because if we constantly look over our shoulders, we will not go forward and there will be no new thinking.

That is why I would propose to return to the specific questions of today about which we spoke. In particular, the remark made by Chancellor Schmidt about the short time remaining to reach agreement on medium-range missiles made a strong impression on me. But a large doubt also exists. The Soviet Union, in order to facilitate this solution, to make use of this short period of time, has separated the medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package and put forth this question. The United States immediately ties its own package to these missiles. In particular it is trying to shove the question of increased-range operational and tactical missiles into this package or, reduced-range [ponizhennoy dalnosti] missiles as they are called. I have a feeling that despite everything, the FRG position has its own nuances on this question, as do a number of other European NATO countries that are of the opinion, I think, taking into the account the short time left, that missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km should be discussed at a later date, and with their complete destruction in mind, which is our position. I would like to hear the opinion of our West German colleagues on this issue.

[Zorin interrupts] I would just like to say that circumstances have appeared recently that cause alarm. First of all there are Washington's attempts to link the problem of medium-range missiles with the problem of limited-range [ogranichennoy dalnosti] missiles.

Second, there are attempts to devise some kind of strange operation around the modernization of Pershing missiles, the removal of one component of the missiles but leaving the Pershings in Europe, instead of agreeing, as Reagan first said, to their withdrawal. This creates the impression that some officials in Washington are unhappy with the zero option that was talked about. This, at any rate, is the impression the Soviet public gets. Mr Ruehe, you wanted to say something.

[Ruehe] We want to remain loyal to our previous policy and we came out in support of a zero option before the Soviet Union. I do not want to fight past battles, but we must remember one thing for the future. We must save an entrance way for ourselves. We should not arm ourselves, then arm ourselves further so that serious talks can begin as has happened in the past, unfortunately. Talks should be held first. We remain loyal to our position on the zero option -- this is a West German as well as an American position -- but for both sides.

In 1983 it was possible to have a version that meant zero on our side and preservation of missiles on the Soviet side. No, we want zero-zero. As far as short-range missiles are concerned, we said in 1981 that...

[Zorin interrupts] Excuse me please. Who are we?

[Ruehe] NATO, which has been conducting talks since 1981. In this case complete unity exists between the Americans and Germans.

[Zorin] I understand, but this does not conform with the latest statements made by Washington in the last few days.

[Ruehe] I would say now that in its latest statement its position was that there should not be any new zones for the arms race. In the 1970's the superpowers concluded two treaties on intercontinental missiles. The arms race was then transferred to the area of medium-range missiles. The problems we have been talking about then appeared, so the zero option for medium-range missiles should not be linked here with a decision on short-range missiles. This is simply a firm promise concerning future talks and concerning this aim.

Now what is this aim? It is our opinion that the aim lies in arriving at the minimum number of systems and equal rights, of course, or zero. Less systems. If we talk about zero, then the problem must be linked with conventional weapons. So we have given an absolutely unequivocal yes to the zero option. But we must frustrate the transfer of the arms race to another area, for example to the area of short-range weapons, so that no new systems are developed [sozdavat] in this area as occurred with medium-range missiles. Agreement must be reached on talks on this question and the aim of the talks -- disarmament in this area -- must be clearly set down, as well as equal rights for both sides.

Over a period of several months, decisions on medium-range missiles can be worked out and agreement can be reached on the aim of talks on short-range missiles, if there is a political will to achieve agreement. We must not only think in a new way, we must also arrive at new efforts, on both sides, because we need a completely verifiable agreement. In reality this means that U.S. servicemen will have to carry out on-site verification on Soviet soil, and, of course, the other way around. To date, this has not occurred, and so objectively we still face certain difficulties and certain complex problems.

So it is completely incorrect to argue and to maintain that there is a lack of desire here or there. No, there is a will, there is a desire, but objective difficulties remain, but we can eliminate them in the next few months. This is the common opinion of the Western alliance.

[Falin] If you permit, Valentin Sergeyevich, I want to state with regard to Mr Ruehe's words: The other way around, well it is the other way around that usually becomes much more difficult, as Reykjavik showed. When we proposed on-site inspection to the United States, it turned out that inspection of Soviet facilities was good, but the other way around, as the U.S. representatives said, would be more difficult.

[Ruehl interrupts] Nein.

[Falin] No it is not Nein. It is true, because this was declared by Mr Perle -- he declared it in my presence -- therefore it is fairly difficult to say no, and in this case your comment on inaccuracies, so to speak, will find no confirmation.

But I also would like to say that we seemed to agree not to talk about history, but, nevertheless, Mr Ruehe just made a statement and from what he said it appears that we are returning to history. Who initiated the zero option? You say that your West German zero option proposal has a longer history than the Soviet one. But you are incorrect. We proposed a zero option for medium-range weapons to the Americans at the end of the 1960's and if, as you say, there were two agreements that touched only on strategic missiles or strategic weapons, then ask yourself the question: Why only strategic weapons? Who was against including nonstrategic weapons in these agreements?

The United States was against this. It did not accept our corresponding proposals. This is a documented fact. These documents need not be recognized, but they also cannot be refuted. Besides, as you know, in November 1981, we proposed a zero option for nuclear weapons in Europe in general. This would be a zero option. However, as I understand your words today, you are not ready for this kind of zero option even today, for various reasons.

But, nevertheless, I would like to appeal to you, if time permits, to discuss more substantially what can be done today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and not to argue about history. We view history from different perspectives, and we see different features in this history. Let us try to take a look at the future from the same perspective.

[Zorin] Mr Chancellor Schmidt.

[Schmidt] I am in complete agreement with the last proposal made by Mr Falin. I think that it is very useful to study history. It always enriches one's knowledge. But there is no sense in giving various interpretations of historic events for 2-3 minutes to engage in exchanges with one another on this. I do not want to take part in a game of ping pong with history. But my neighbor to the left, or was it you, Mr Chairman, spoke about Reykjavik and about the package of proposals. I want to make a philosophical remark.

I was frightened by the package of proposals made in Reykjavik by Mr Gorbachev because it proposed to solve many things at once. I am an old man with great experience in political activity, and I know that it is a rare event when a large problem is solved at once. What I learned, be it in economic or foreign policy or in military policy, was that if there is an aim to be achieved, then it is necessary at first to make the first step, then the second, and then the third.

To take a thousand steps at once sounds wonderful, but this rarely happens. It frightened me when I heard of the entire package of proposals made in Reykjavik. I fully agree that what Mr Gorbachev did made it possible to take the first step. This concerns the zero option for medium-range missiles.

Now the second philosophical idea. When I was still actively involved in politics, I made many appearances, including at the United Nations. I spoke about the need for partnership relations between both sides. The Soviet Union cannot preserve its peace alone. Neither can the United States and Western Europe preserve our peace alone. For this we need the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. For this you need us and the Americans and NATO to preserve peace. We can only take little steps together.

There is one point that plays a major role in this; it also played a major role during our meetings here and during our talk with Mr Gromyko, whom I had an opportunity to visit. I am talking about restructuring, which today plays a major role in the Soviet Union. We are talking about economic restructuring. As I understand it, you are staking great hopes on restructuring. I can only advise you to take one step after another. I say this on the basis of my experience in the area of economics. Do not immediately lay too many hopes on this. But there is one thing that I know for certain. The biggest step that you can take, and one of the most important steps that the Americans can take, if they want to improve the economic situation, is to reduce military spending. All the money that today is being spent on the production of cannons or aircraft, or tanks or missiles, can be used for the construction of apartments, the manufacture of television receivers, or automobiles for ordinary people.

What is happening in the PRC made an enormous impression on me. That country is a very long way from here, but it is a very important country. It is the world's third market. They have enormous economic problems and the standard of living is very low -- $300 a year per capita. It is hard to imagine how poor the country is.

During the era of Mao Zedong a great amount of money was spent by them for military purposes. Now they have decided to start economic restructuring. The Chinese have a different name for it. They made the unilateral decision to decrease military expenditures. They are not tied to a partnership with either the Soviet Union or the United States. They reduced their military expenditure. Modernization in the areas of science, research, education, and the economy was given first priority. Modernization in the area of defense was reduced to second priority. This truly is a new form of thinking. I would like to wish you as well as us in the West the same.

We are spending much too much of our productive forces on defense. At the same time, we are neutralizing each other and are hindering our mutual economic progress.

[Zorin] I perceive a contradiction in what you were saying, Mr Chancellor, and before I allow Valentin Mikhaylovich to have a word, I would like to draw your attention to the following: One the one hand you have been convincing us and our television viewers that there is little time left, that we are in a time of trouble, while at the same time you speak out in favor of small steps. I see a clear contradiction between these two premises. Valentin Mikhaylovich, please.

[Falin] I am in agreement with Mr Schmidt that we must not miss out on opportunities, even little ones if they present themselves, in order to move forward. As far as Reykjavik is concerned: There, an attempt was made to make a breakthrough.

A breakthrough may well have been possible; it may have been one of those rare instances about which you spoke -- an occasion that could have been historic. It was an historic opportunity that could have turned the development of world events into a fundamentally new channel. If not for the persistence of the Americans on the well-known question of SDI, then a decision such as this could have become a reality. But the matter is not that the opportunity was not taken. In any case, when we speak about medium-range missile talks, we still lean on the experience gained at Reykjavik. In essence, the Soviet proposal, as put forth at the talks in Geneva, is the proposal that was worked out at the end of the medium-range talks in Reykjavik. It is precisely that version of decisions which was there and which was not tied to any additional conditions, as the United States is now doing. These additional conditions are a step backwards by the American side in comparison to Reykjavik.

I feel that there is one more point that needs to be mentioned. We do not perceive our proposals on medium-range missiles as a final step in the struggle for a nuclear free world and a nuclear free Europe or in disarmament as a whole. We see our proposal and its achievement as a very large step, as a very important way station on the road to a better world in which there will be no threat to the destruction of mankind. We see this step as a precondition to the creation of that universal security where stability in the interests of security for one is a condition for creating the same stable security for the other. We do not wish, and this was said on many occasions by Mikhail Sergeyevich, to have better security for ourselves than we are prepared to make available to the Americans, or to any other country. But we do wish the other states, and that includes the United States, would recognize our rights to similarly normal and good security for us and our friends.

I am prepared to say more, citing Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, that it is not a problem for us to bring down the military potential to a level that would be completely consistent with the requirements of defense and exclusively for defense. This is not a problem for the Soviet Union. We are prepared for such talks, for such decisions. That is why we would have been pleased if NATO had viewed and reacted to the proposals that are being put forward by the socialist countries in a more lively manner.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehe.

[Ruehe] I favor the policies under the following banner: Let us do that which can be done. Let us not concern ourselves with utopia. There are some who pursue utopia to hide their inability or their unwillingness to take specific steps. Therefore, I maintain that the zero option for medium-range missiles would be a major step. We will fulfill our responsibilities if this step is taken this year, for during the past 10 years there have been no such agreements. The SALT treaties have determined only the upper arms limits. They were not agreements on disarmament. This then, would be the first instance of an agreement on disarmament, with broad verification possibilities. Therefore, this would be a major step forward, the next step forward. We must not allow ourselves to be led away from this by becoming involved with utopia. We must take this step. Then we will acquire the strength to take further steps. We have time this year to reach such an agreement.

I think that what we need is mutual security. Each must try to understand the legitimate security interests of the other. No one today can single-handedly ensure security for oneself.

In the West, we are dispirited by the fact that the Soviet Union, in our opinion, in the area of conventional weapons, has created a potential that does not correspond to the legitimate interests of security. This should be discussed in the coming years.

This should be discussed by the Warsaw Pact and by NATO, where the security of countries is ensured. Only a defensive potential should be preserved. Let us not concern ourselves with utopia. Let us not now talk about a world without weapons. But this is not enough. One has to place oneself in the position of the other country. That is why we must ensure general security at the disarmament talks.

[Bahr] Mr Ruehe, I disagree with you on one point. You use the word utopia in a negative way. I consider that to be wrong. I need to have some prospects, say to the year 2000. That is only 13 years. Two years ago one would have been ridiculed if one said that one wanted to make the world nuclear-free. Do you wish to say that this is utopian? I would like to say that it is a goal.

I experienced great satisfaction when the U.S. President, together with Mr Gorbachev, put their signatures to this goal. We have no cause to say that they are utopians. I consider them to be people who have placed before themselves achievable goals. We must not be merely optimists. We realistically must think through what steps must be taken to get closer to this goal. I do not know whether we will reach this goal by the year 2000. Perhaps we will reach it by the year 2005. That also would be good.

[Ruehl] Mr Chairman, I would like to clarify that when I said no before, it was in regard to the words of Mr Falin. This was in regard to the position of the FRG Government and not with what was agreed upon at Reykjavik and about which you spoke with Mr Perle. I did not have that in mind. We have a political position. It is quite simple. Verification will take place on our territory. As we are speaking, officers of the Bundeswehr together with officers of other NATO member countries are observing the military maneuvers of the Soviet Union and the GDR. They are being accompanied by Soviet and GDR officers. This is taking place in accordance with the Final Act signed at Helsinki and according to the decision of the Stockholm conference. I consider this to be an important specific step forward. This is the path that we must follow.

There is another thing that I must add. Not about utopia or about pseudo-utopia, about which Mr Bahr spoke. I wish to say that we must concentrate all our attention on nuclear weapons. We also must be concerned with conventional weapons and with the question of alignment of forces. That is, with thoe problems that have been included on the agenda. What we need is not just general or mutual security, we also need security that also would ensure the security of small or weak countries in relation to the big and strong Soviet Union.

This can be achieved only through talks. Therefore, we are happy that talks are now taking place in Vienna. Of course we need time. By the way, Mr Chairman, there is an old French saying: He who rushes loses time. I think that this is what Federal Chancellor Schmidt had in mind when he said that the second step should not be taken before making the first step.

[Zorin] I think it is very significant that there was some department among our West German friends. It is very typical of the situation that has now developed in the world. A debate is raging, not only in West Germany and the United States; a struggle is being waged. This indicates the difficulty of the problems under discussion and shows both the difficult situation and those difficulties that we are facing.

[Zhurkin] I would like to respond briefly to a number of previous remarks. First to the words of Chancellor Schmidt regarding the PRC: It is apparent that any person who has been there from the West or the East comes away with deep impressions. The energies with which the problems are being solved and the difficulties that China faces make up wish them sucess in the solution of their problems.

One other thing is worthy of note. China is one of the nuclear powers. I am pleased to note that on a series of very important questions our position coincides with that of China. Take for example the Rarotonga Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. Who came out in support of this treaty? The Soviet Union and the PRC. Who undertook an obligation not to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons? The PRC and the Soviet Union. I could continue with this list. In general I am in agreement. One must not be locked in only within that circle of problems that we have been discussing. We should also pay attention to the positive processes in other parts of the world.

A brief comment on what Mr Ruehe said. He said that SALT I and SALT II are not that important. How are they not important? Before 1972, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States built a single ICBM silo. [sentence as heard] They were being built for 10 years and then for 15 years they were not built. If it were not for this agreement it would be difficult to estimate what we and the Americans would have built. Therefore, I think that in this context we are quite right to put the question as sharply as we do, about the United States undertaking an inadmissible step in breaching the SALT II treaty and officially stating its intent to do this.

Third, I am in complete agreement with Mr Ruehl. Mr Ruehl and other West German colleagues spoke about this. It is the question of the importance of reduction of conventional, or as they are called, general purpose forces or conventional armed forces, and conventional arms. This is an important question. But I feel that it is necessary somehow to attempt to break away from the frames of traditional dialogue in this sphere. What does the traditional dialogue consist of? The accusation is being made that the Warsaw Pact forces are larger. We are attempting to prove that there is approximate parity. I can give you dozens of quotes and facts that are well known to you. Let us try to approach this from a nontraditional point of view. The Warsaw Pact countries attempted this. It may appeal to you or not. It is a proposal to reduce the numerical strength of the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces by a million as a major but not isolated step. Other such steps are possible. Let us think how to approach these questions in an unconventional way. And, while we are at it, let us consider how to discuss all the existing claims on both sides, because these mutual claims have to be approached with great care. With this I am in agreement.

[Zorin] Mr Chancellor.

[Schmidt] In regard to what you have said, I wish to note the following: I consider it futile to reproach each other about what has already taken place. Today there are no U.S. representatives here. I could say much in their defense. But this is not my task. I am not a defender. But I consider it unnecessary to attack them in their absence. Rather, I would like to say the following: In exactly the same way as we all agreed on, I will say that none of us and none of the great powers, be it the Soviet Union or the United States, can by itself ensure peace or security for itself. We are all dependent on each other and are tied to each other. We also must realize that we are dependent on each other in the economic area as well and that we are tied to each other by culture.

During recent days I have heard much about the common European household. I was somewhat surprised by this. I frequently have been to America and have often encountered anticommunist and anti-Soviet positions there. I have often said: What would your concerts, say in Chicago, or in Pittsburgh, or in Los Angeles be like if there were no Mussorgskiy, Tchaikovskiy, Shostakovich, or Prokofyev?

Today I say: What would Moscow concerts be like if there were no Mozart, Beethoven, Verdi, or Puccini? All of them are the product of a common culture that was created over a period of more than 1,000 years. We depend on one another.

Despite the Nazi period, as a youth I fortunately had the opportunity to read Aleksandr Pushkin, Dostoyevskiy, Ivan Turgenev, Lermontov, Tolstoy, and others. Fortunately, I had the opportunity to read Jack London, Mark Twain, William Faulkner, Saroyan, and others. This is one world, and a certain American who has long been dead spoke about this. His name was Wendell Willkie. He wanted to be president, but he did not make it. He proposed the thesis of one world. This one world will not become any better if one accuses another of making mistakes in 1975, in 1960, or in 1950. All sides made mistakes. The most horrible mistake was made by Hitler. We continue to this day to suffer because of it. But there is no sense in dragging the memory of all these mistakes with us as we try to build the future. I want to say that it is not worth playing ping pong with history.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] I agree with you, Mr Schmidt -- we do not need to handle history like ping pong or to play with history. Nonetheless, if in our discussion today incorrect assertions appear, regardless of whether they concern the present or the past, we probably have to react to them or respond. Take for instance Mr Ruehe's remark that talks concluded in the 1970's did not envisage a reduction in arms, but only their limitation.

The SALT II treaty envisaged a reduction of strategic arms by 10 percent, and this is not a small figure. If the SALT III treaty had been worked out, as was envisaged, then the reduction would have been far more significant and much broader.

As far as conventional arms are concerned, permit me to recall a German saying: The neighbor's hen always looks like a goose. [laughter] That is why....

[Schmidt interrupts in German without translation] A German or Russian saying? [laughter]

[Falin] German. These conventional armed forces of ours seem different than similar armed forces that you have. This depends, as Albert Einstein said, on which theory you rely on. This wise man, who is respected in our country, said that what a man sees or does not see depends on the theory that man follows. We want to see everything as it is. Just 2 years ago General Secretary Gorbachev proposed: Please, if you consider that we have more armaments in some area of conventional arms than you have, let us sit down at the table and discuss it. We are prepared to make reductions. But we proceed from the premise that you will be ready to reduce those arms in which you have more weapons systems than we have.

Two years have passed and there has been no reaction. This means that either you are not too concerned by a real imbalance [pereves], as you say, or there is no imbalance. Either one or the other. Let us nevertheless get on with business. It is business, not propaganda about business or talk about business, that will lead us to better security. Even if we deny, even if we come out against the simple fact that today, particularly in Europe, there cannot be two securities, one better for us and worse for you or vice versa, we will not annul this truism.

There can be only one security for all of us, a good one that is better for us all, or a worse one, insofar as we cannot fight in Europe. Europe has had its fill of fighting [otvoyevalas], once and for all. It has had its fill of the use of nuclear weapons -- fortunately it was never used here -- and of the use of conventional weapons.

So let us take this fact as a starting point, and springing from it solve all the questions, even those that seem today to be utopian to you.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehe.

[Ruehe] I think that there is complete unity among all Europeans insofar as nobody has as much experience with war as the Europeans. The policy that guides us says no to war and yes to freedom so that the states and societies can develop according to their wishes in peaceful competition with one another. This is why arms limitation is also essential in the area of conventional arms, and the abolition of borders is essential in the area of culture and science.

What Helmut Schmidt said here is of very great importance, but he spoke more about the past. But even today there are many wonderful musicians, writers both in the Soviet Union and in Western Europe, who could mutually enrich us. If the hearts of people have a clear idea of people on the other side, this will make war impossible. This is why, if we are defense experts, we should take these matters into consideration, too. This also concerns our viewers. If they could read books, if they could follow such interesting discussions on television, and so forth, then this would be an important contribution to the cause of peace and cooperation in Europe.

[Bahr] I spoke about utopias and about the need to have prospects. Now I would like to talk about the need for consistency of steps. Security comes first. If this is clear, then the economy, and so forth -- and why is clear to all of us -- all these questions will be easier to solve.

[Falin] If I could have a minute please. I think that Mr Schmidt, who has known me for many years, and the other colleagues present here from the FRG will believe me. No one is more outspoken in favor of development of cultural contacts than the Soviet people. Cultural, not pseudocultural. There is not a single state in which books by foreign authors are printed in such large print runs as in the Soviet Union. There is not a single country in which foreign plays are staged as frequently as here. Nor is there a place where foreign films -- perhaps there are more American films shown in your country than here -- are shown more frequently than in the Soviet Union. But the question is not what it would appear to be from your words -- that we intend to divorce ourselves from the culture of other countries. That is not the case. But I fully concur with the words of Mr Bahr. Culture alone will not preserve or distance us from the threat of war. It is an important element, but only an element. The basis of everything today is, unfortunately, security.

[Zorin] Our time on the air is coming to an end. In conclusion I would like to say that we have mentioned several times today the term Europe, the common household. I think it would be more accurate to say that Europe is but a floor in a common household. Our earth has become very small and we Europeans can lay claim to no more than one floor. In relation to this, I want to pose a question to you. What can we do -- I would like all of you to very briefly formulate an answer -- what can Europe do to make our small planet, our world more secure than it is today? We will begin with you, Mr Ruehl, although I understnd that by the nature of your work it is more difficult for you to answer this question.

[Ruehl] Not in the least.

[Zorin] I am very pleased to hear this.

[Ruehl] We must calmly, in a businesslike manner, with patience, but without drawing it out, discuss our differences, as I already have said. Then it will be possible to solve all the problems.

[Zorin] Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] I think that we must, above all, humanize political relations, in the sense of identifying that common denominator present in all our problems, despite apparent differences. If we do not solve the problems, nobody will solve them for us. If we do solve the problems on a mutually acceptable basis, we will solve this problem for each of us and for all of us together.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr.

[Bahr] I would like to start with the next practical step. That is to determine how the result of the elimination of conventional weapons should look and later to determine the steps to this disarmament. These are European matters. Here we can do more than in the area of space or strategic arms.

[Zorin] Mr Ruehe.

[Ruehe] The political division of the world runs through Europe -- through my country, Germany. From here a special responsibility befalls us. If we can eliminate tension here, if we can build bridges across European borders, then we will have achieved something good not only for Europe, but for the whole world.

[Zorin] Professor Zhurkin.

[Zhurkin] I think what is most important is to constantly strive to understand each other, to understand the concerns and anxieties and the aspirations and hopes of the other side -- not only to understand, but to try to solve these problems jointly.

[Zorin] Chancellor Schmidt.

[Schmidt] Part of our discussion today was concerned with the fact that there are many people on both sides who are afraid of the other side. One of the most important tasks is to avoid fanning the fears in each other; that we not accuse one another without foundation; that we attempt to trust each other. Personally, I can say in all honesty that I belive in Gorbachev's aspiration for peace. It is necessary that people do not cheat each other; that they should not disappoint each other; that people should openly discuss their problems as we have today, even if they adhere to totally different points of view. The more frequent and the more open are the discussions of this sort, not only on your television but on ours as well, the better it is.

The more often people speak to each other, and that includes the common people unhindered by any political reponsibility, the better it is, the less fear there will be. The less fear there is, the easier it is for political figures to strive to conclude agreements.

[Zorin] The time for our broadcast has come to an end. There are many more problems we could have discussed. Today different opinions about the problems discussed were voiced. This is quite natural. I feel that what is more important an significant than these differences of opinions are two circumstances. The first is that this talk, this exchange of views that occurred today, has become possible. I think that not so long ago this would have been unlikely and difficult to bring about. Second, that despite the differences of opinions expressed today on various positions, the participants in the discussion expressed a general concern, a general aspiration by joint means to find a path to peace, to the strengthening of peace.

It is left for me to thank you for participating in our talk, to thank our viewers for their attention. Until we meet again here in our Studio 9, thank you.

SCI-TECH TALKS AT CSCE 'VERY PRODUCTIVE'

LD071130 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] We begin this bulletin with a report from Vienna. There the meeting of representatives of the participating countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is continuing. Viktor Glazunov, our special correspondent, reports:

[Glazunov] Very productive work has been accomplished. That is what the participants from various countries at the Vienna meeting are saying when the topic under discussion is economic, scientific and technological cooperation. True enough, many constructive proposals have been put forward, both by the socialist countries of Europe and by the capitalist countries. Moreover, a number of the proposals from the East and the West on the development of cooperation in economics, science and technology, and ecology complement one another.

This attests to a general realization of the need that has arisen to provide a stimulus to economic and scientific and technological cooperation. Earlier, whenever the talk was of business cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe, basically everything was reduced to trade. Now, new opportunities are opening up here in connection with the economic restructuring in the USSR. The business circles in the West understand this and it is having an effect on the progress of the Vienna meeting. Now the talk is not only of trade, but also of industrial cooperation and the creation of joint enterprises. Specific proposals have been put forward on the entire range of these issues, particularly on an initiative to hold a scientific forum, which came from a number of West European countries. The countries of northern Europe, having supported the initiative of Bulgaria on an ecological forum, proposed holding it at a high level and with ministerial participation.

TASS ON U.S. 'SPY SCARE' CAMPAIGN, SHULTZ VISIT

LD081416 Moscow TASS in English 1737 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 8 TASS -- Another spy-scare campaign has been launched in the U.S. on the initiative of the Washington administration ahead of the visit to the USSR of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz scheduled for mid-April.

The U.S. mass media stirred up by the White House is in an uproar over some "Soviet penetration" of the U.S. Embassy in the USSR. U.S. President Ronald Reagan personally joined the campaign. He held a special press conference in the White House Wednesday at which he announced that the staff of the U.S. Embassy would not move to the new embassy building until he satisfied himself that all the security measures were observed there.

Reagan emphasized that he had instructed Shultz to turn the problem of the security situation in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow into the main item of the agenda of the coming talks. In other words, the disarmament problem is being artificially relegated to the background by Washington.

Judging by all appearances, by kindling another spy-scare campaign Washington intends to again intimidate the man in the street with some "Soviet threat", to make him believe in the necessity of stepping up the arms race, to distract his attention from the really burning problems connected with the preservation of peace and the consolidation of security.

With this sensational campaign around some "Soviet espionage" Washington is trying to play down the "Irangate" scandal which is very unpleasant to it and to distract from it the attention of millions of Americans. One gets the impression that the CIA, which has profound experience in organizing such machinations is behind this anti-Soviet campaign. It is headed today by William Webster, former head of the FBI which became notorious for its continuous witchcraft campaigns in the country.

The spy-scare campaign concocted in the White House is obviously a political provocation. Only opponents of detente, those who wish to slander the Soviet Union and its peaceful aspirations will gain from it. One cannot but agree in this connection with the opinion of Raymond Garthoff, a senior staff member of the Brookings Institute who said in a TASS interview that the kindling of the spy-scare campaign in the U.S. did not promote in any way the improvement of the climate in American-Soviet relations.

SHULTZ HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE BEFORE VISIT

LD090735 Moscow TASS in English 0714 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 9 TASS -- U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz gave a news conference on April 8 devoted to his visit to Moscow in the middle of April. He told the media that on Wednesday he had had his last meeting with President Reagan and "had the completion of his instructions" for the forthcoming talks in Moscow.

George Shultz said, inter alia, that the United States approached all problems "in a constructive spirit" and that the President was resolved to continue such discussions if they would help achieve agreements in U.S. interest and a way to a more constructive and stable relationship with the Soviet Union.

However, contrary to his stated wish for "constructive relations" with the USSR, the secretary of state confirmed that Washington intended to apply a "broader interpretation" of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, which is standing in the way of Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" program.

The larger part of the press conference was devoted to "the security of the American Embassy in Moscow." George Shultz said that the environment at the Moscow talks would be very difficult, that the American delegation would have to work in extremely taxing conditions and that all that "cast a heavy shadow on our discussions."

Asked by a journalist if the current campaign related to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was not a U.S. "attempt to sabotage, to prejudge the discussions that you're going to be having in Moscow, and to make them more difficult," George Shultz said that "we're upset at them,...and we intend to do everything we can to correct our problems."

EMBASSY ESPIONAGE CLAIMS 'ABSOLUTELY GROUNDLESS'

LD090809 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English 1400 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Another vicious and vile anti-Soviet campaign has been unleashed in Washington. Officials of the State Department, the American press and even President Reagan himself are claiming there is some kind of Soviet espionage going on at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. In particular the claim is made that eavesdropping devices were planted in the new U.S. Embassy building in the Soviet capital, which has not been inhabited yet, and that Soviet agents time and again had entered the old embassy building by bribing or hoodwinking the guards. One would think there is no sense in discussing such fairy-tale subjects, which are well known from the times of the cold war, yet the present anti-Soviet spectacle being staged in Washington arouses particular indignation among us, and in all likelihood not only among us but among all those who expect hopefully real changes in Soviet-American dialogue on disarmament. And President Reagan, who had agreed a priori with the absolutely groundless claims about Soviet espionage, says that this will be the chief subject of the forthcoming talks State Secretary Shultz is to be holding in Moscow.

We in the Soviet Union had hoped and are continuing to hope that the main subject of these talks would be the most cardinal issue of the times, namely the question concerning the bridling of nuclear militarism, and removing the threat facing mankind, that is, of self-destruction.

So, what turns out? It turns out that the leaders of the United States are simply seeking or creating pretexts and excuses to block up the way to reaching the most important and most serious accords with the Soviet Union. It turns out that once again they are resorting to the trick that was used time and again whenever there was light appearing on the horizon of Soviet-American relations, or when Washington was undertaking some kind of new step in the arms race.

One might recall the American provocation of dispatching a South Korean passenger plane on an espionage mission into the Soviet Union's airspace. It was undertaken for fanning up mistrust towards our country, for backing up lies concerning some kind of Soviet aggressiveness, particularly at that moment, when the Pentagon wanted to reconcile public opinion in West Europe with the deployment of first strike American nuclear missiles there.

In Soviet public circles the opinion is being voiced that the present campaign of anti-Soviet slander also pursues a very specific objective incidentally having nothing to do with the conditions of work of American diplomats in Moscow. And this objective in all likelihood is to disrupt the crystallizing accords on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, a question which is so inconvenient for the supporters of the nuclear strength policy; a question which the Soviet Union has singled out from the entire complex of disarmament questions in order to get the things out of a stalemate. One can probably agree with those who connect the present attempt to smear the Soviet Union with Washington's desire to distract public attention from the scandal that has erupted around Irangate, and this scandal brings to light not democratism (?of) the American system but the dirty [word indistinct] of American politics.

SENATE HOLDS HEARINGS ON APPOINTMENT OF CIA DIRECTOR

LD090540 Moscow TASS in English 0535 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 9 TASS -- Hearings have opened at U.S. Congress into the appointment of current FBI Chief William Webster [as] the CIA director. The hearings, conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, are bringing out facts which call in question the propriety of Webster's conduct in the affair with secret arms sales to Iran and the diversion of part of the proceeds to the contras. The FBI director was aware of the arms sales way back last summer. A month before the "Iran-contras" scandal broke out, Webster had been informed that the actions of one of the chief organizers of the operation, National Security Council employee Oliver North, could become the subject of a criminal investigation. Webster actually ignored the information. At a news conference before the hearings, representatives of public organizations also called for investigations of legal violations by the FBI under Webster.

TASS SAYS U.S. NOT INTERESTED IN PEACE IN DRA

LD081540 Moscow TASS in English 1323 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- TASS news analyst Valeriy Vavilov writes:

Is Washington interested in a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan? Facts show that it is not.

How can Washington's practical actions aimed at building up arms deliveries to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries, at the escalation of the undeclared war against Afghanistan be assessed otherwise? THE WASHINGTON POST writes that the Reagan administration just sent to Afghan counterrevolutionaries another 600 "Stinger" anti-aircraft missiles including missiles of the latest modification which have not yet been adopted for service even by the U.S. Armed Forces. It is clearly with the aim of dragging out the fratricidal war indefinitely that the United States increases appropriations for the Afghan counterrevolutionaries, the appropriations that will make up 630 million dollars this year.

The prospects for an arrangement that opened during the Pakistani-Afghan talks in Geneva apparently run counter to Washington's calculations. Washington is also annoyed with the process of national reconciliation, ignores the striving of Afghanistan's government to end war.

Deliberately distorting facts, Washington is spreading the myth that it is the "schedule of Soviet troop withdrawal" that is the main obstacle to the settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. And Washington passes in silence the main thing: the continued outside armed interference in the affairs of the sovereign Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Islamabad toes Washington's line. This was confirmed again by the speech of Pakistan's Prime Minister Junejo in London. Dwelling on the "Afghan problem" he did not say a word about the United States negative stand, while facts show that the USA continues using Pakistan's territory for staging ever more provocations against Afghanistan.

There is a way for the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan. It is well known in Washington and in Islamabad. What is required for this? The stirring up of the armed conflict in Afghanistan should above all be stopped. The objective realities and the demands of the Afghan people should be recognised. An end must be put to obstacles to the efforts of all the parties concerned, an end to interference in the affairs of Afghanistan and nonresumption of this interference must be guaranteed.

As is known, the Soviet Union is for the settlement of the problem by political means, on the basis of an end to outside interference. Soviet troops came to Afghanistan at the request of its government and they will be returned home in the framework of a political settlement. The process of national reconciliation and settlement around Afghanistan has already been started and is in progress. The main thing is not to obstruct it, to stop any interference in the affairs of that sovereign country which wants to be and will be neutral, nonaligned.

PAPER CITES NAJIBULLAH ON DRA POLICY OBJECTIVES

PM081143 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 8 Apr 87 p 3

[TASS report: "Aim of the National Reconciliation Policy"]

[Text] Berlin, 7 Apr -- A total end to the bloodshed in Afghanistan was and still is the most important aim of the national reconciliation policy, Najib, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, declared in a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND interview.

In the foreign policy sphere, he pointed out, this means a consistent desire to peacefully solve the problems around Afghanistan. It is necessary to establish propitious, mutually advantageous relations with neighboring countries -- China, Iran, and Pakistan. Afghanistan is ready to welcome all who left it, whatever their reasons for doing so. It is a question of reconciliation with all true patriots, regardless of differences in their views or membership of particular political parties and groupings.

Najib went on to point out that 1,100 national reconciliation extraordinary commissions are now operating in the country's provinces, cities, and villages. Religious figures and representatives of the national bourgeoisie, even including ones who did not previously support the people's power, also work on them in addition to workers, peasants, and representatives of the intelligentsia. More than 40,000 people who ended up abroad through the vicissitudes of fate have now returned to the motherland. In addition, approximately 20,000 members of armed groupings have laid down their arms and returned to their homes.

The elections to local organs of power, Najib said, were a concrete expression of the broadening social base of power in the DRA. The country has thereby entered a new stage in the democratization of life.

DRA REFUGEES RETURN DESPITE OBSTACLES, REPRESSION

PM071529 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by V. Krotov under the rubric "Notes a Propos": "Preventing Them from Returning to Their Homes"]

[Text] More than 37,000 Afghan refugees have recently crossed the Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian borders to return to their homes.

This migration of thousands upon thousands of people has become possible since the proclamation, almost 2 months ago, of the program for national reconciliation adopted by the DRA Government. The stream of emigres returning to Afghanistan continues to swell despite the obstacle created by Pakistani and Iranian reactionary forces and also the leaders of Afghan counterrevolution, who see their influence and authority slipping away.

Things are not going too well for them, and this is prompting them to make statements along the lines of that made at a special conference in Peshawar by Hikmatyar, leader of the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan." "Many Afghan refugees," he admitted, "welcome the policy of national reconciliation proclaimed by the government in Kabul. In large numbers they are selling their private property and preparing to return home. Sections of them have already accomplished this." The leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan threatened to "obstruct this trend, right up to the use of the death penalty."

His "deeds" match his words. Many Afghans who wanted to return to the DRA have had their ears, noses, or hands cut off and then been killed. On the Qandahar route alone some 500 refugees have been detained and subjected to repression by dushman gang leaders.

The Pakistani authorities are also taking an active part in the repressions. Units of the regular Pakistani Army have surrounded "rebel settlements," fencing them in with barbed wire and turning them into concentration camps. All the exits from these torture and death "enclosures" are mined by Pakistani sappers. Governor Majid Khan of Quetta himself recently appealed to a large group of Afghans to "be sure to stay" in Pakistan. He was unstinting with promises of better material assistance and food supplies, and he threatened those who disobey with "grave punishment."

At Kurram the local police chief has issued instructions that Afghans who decide to return home should be physically annihilated. A special "decree" issued in this context says that anyone who reports potential returnees to the authorities will receive a machine gun for his own use and a personal certificate confirming his loyality to the Pakistani regime.

While pursuing the same aim -- preventing Afghan refugees from returning home -- the Iranian authorities have adopted a somewhat different approach. In areas bordering on Afghanistan, the Iranian authorities have "advised" refugees to voluntarily declare their intention to return to Afghanistan. Special registration centers have even been opened at "Islamic Revolution Guards Corps" branches. As soon as groups of Afghan refugees declare their intention to return home, their property is confiscated and their camps destroyed.

Despite the threats and repressions, a considerable number of Afghan refugees nonetheless intend to return home. They are demanding their right to a home, they want to live and fight together with their own people against the enemies of a free Afghanistan. In the last weeks of March alone, around 11,000 former Afghan refugees voluntarily joined the ranks of the Afghan People's Army to fight against those who profited from their trials and tribulations abroad.

Rebels Blocking Return

LD081040 Moscow TASS in English 0955 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- The tactics of Afghan counterrevolutionary leaders who are trying together with Pakistani authorities to block the return home of Afghan refugees consist of three component parts: false propaganda, the bribing of those who are hesitating and terror against those who made up their minds to return home, PRAVDA pointed out today in a report from Kabul by Vadim Okulov.

In refugee camps they are trying to keep people from returning to Afghanistan by giving to them more food and clothes and increasing allowances for one person, the newspaper wrote. However, the lion's share of all those allowances finds its way, as usual, to the pockets of the ringleaders. After the Afghan Government announced its policy of national reconciliation, the 'wages' of the heads of Afghan counterrevolution were raised to the level unheard to by ordinary Afghan. G. Hikmatyar began to receive 140,000 afghanis and B. Rabbani, Khalis and S.A. Gilani -- 120,000 afghanis a month.

Informers operate in refugee camps who denounce those intending to return home. There is a typical example of such tactics: A gang headed by a certain Ehsannula which is deployed in Pakistan 30 km south-east of Peshawar created a network of informers in a refugee camp in order to intercept in time the refugees seeking to return to Afghanistan.

There is no avoiding the fact that the attempts to keep refugees in Pakistani camps and in Iran, using their stay there for political and other purposes, sometimes prove to be effective. And still, not a day passes without refugees coming to the department for refugees in Kabul.

The newspaper pointed out that the flow of refugees returning home was not interrupted even for a single day. Lies and intimidation can hardly stop people who believe that their compatriots are waiting for them in their homeland.

GORBACHEV GREETS SRI LANKA'S SILVA ON REELECTION

PM080957 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 87 First Edition p 1

[Telegram from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to K.P. Silva, general secretary of the Sri Lanka Communist Party Central Committee, on his reelection -- date not given]

[Text] To K.P. Silva, general secretary of the Sri Lanka Communist Party Central Committee:

Dear Comrade Katturge Pablis Silva!

I cordially congratulate you on your reelection as general secretary of the Sri Lanka Communist Party Central Committee. I wish you and all Sri Lanka communists success in the struggle for the vital interests of Sri Lanka's working people, for your country's social progress, for friendship between the peoples of our countries, and for peace in Asia and throughout the world.

With fraternal communist greetings,

M.S. Gorbachev

CPSU SENDS GREETINGS TO BANGLADESH CP CONGRESS

PM081019 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 87 First Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee greets Communist Party of Bangladesh Congress on occasion of party congress -- date not given]

[Text] To the Fourth Communist Party of Bangladesh [CPB] Congress

Dear Comrades,

The CPSU Central Committee sends ardent fraternal greetings to the delegates of the Fourth CPB Congress and all Bangladeshi Communists.

Your party's congress is taking place during a difficult and tense time in the world's development, when mankind is faced with the full magnitude of the major and urgent task of averting the threat of thermonuclear war and saving the world and life on our planet.

The Soviet Union has proposed a specific program to eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of our century, improve the international situation, and preserve and strengthen world peace. The threat to peace remains, however. It was created by the policy pursued by the most aggressive imperialist circles and their course of fueling the arms race, transferring it to outer space, and interfering in other states' internal affairs.

If the world is to be saved from nuclear catastrophe it is more essential than ever that there by joint efforts on the part of all peace-loving states and concerted action by all people of good will.

Broad strata of the public and political parties and governments of many countries in Asia are increasingly actively and resolutely engaged in the struggle for peace and security, objectively linking with the ending of the arms race the possibility of resolving the complex problems of their own socioeconomic development and improving the life of the masses of the people.

Soviet Communists are aware that the CPB consistently opposes the intrigues of imperialism, works for the relaxation of international tension, advocates peace in Asia and throughout the world, and defends the Bangladeshi working people's vital interests.

We wish the Fourth BCP Congress successful and productive work.

May the fraternal ties between the CPSU and BCP and the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and Bangladeshi peoples strengthen and develop.

CPSU Central Committee

SPACE ADMINISTRATION HEAD DENIES ARIANE INTEREST

LD072029 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 7 Apr 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Aleksandr Dunayev, head of the USSR Central Space Administration, by Sergey Slipchenko on recent French allegations of espionage involving Ariane-5 rocket; date, place not given -- recorded]

[Text] [Slipchenko] Aleksandr Ivanovich, to what extent can the secrets of the French Ariane-5 space vehicle interest Soviet engineers, designers, and the creators of space-rocket equipment?

[Dunayev] As is known, the Ariane-5 rocket is designed to carry into near-Earth orbit a payload of 15 to 17 tons. In the Soviet Union, the Proton rocket, which can carry into the same orbit a payload of up to 20 tons, and in certain cases even 21 tons, has been in existence and in use for over 20 years. From the technical viewpoint, therefore, and considering the fact that it is planned to build Ariane-5 in 1994-95, neither the engine, nor the guidance system, nor the assembly of the Ariane rocket are of any interest to specialists.

I can only add that the hue-and-cry raised in France about the theft of the secrets of the Ariane rocket does nothing to promote good and fruitful cooperation, which we have been conducting with France for over 25 years now In our view, and I believe (?NASA) specialists will share our view, this is the work of people who are opposed to our cooperation in the field of the peaceful conquest of space, and against our cooperation with France.

CHARIKOV COMMENTS ON 'SPY MANIA' IN FRANCE, U.S.

LD072131 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1625 GMT 7 Apr 87

[From the "International Dairy" program, presented by Vyacheslav Lavrentyev; Igor Charikov commentary]

[Text] [Lavrentyev] As you remember, comrades, the present (?row) concerning the spy mania in the West started in France over rumors about the theft of secret information on the Ariane rocket. The French authorities announced the expulsion of three Soviet diplomats who allegedly had been involved in this business. They also arrested a Soviet citizen who had gone to the city of Rouen with her husband, a French citizen.

This turned out to be not enough for the anti-Soviets. The more so because apart from the noise, as they say, nothing came of it. So they have chosen the latest target for whipping up hysteria, this time an uninspired target -- the building had become the booty of Soviet spies. The valiant U.S. Marines did not, it seems, keep the secrets of their diplomats safe. What have you to say on this score, Igor Pavlovich? I am talking to my colleague, the commentator Igor Charikov.

[Charikov] It seems they did not keep things safe; what is more, they fell victim, as the U.S. papers write, to the intrigues of cunning Russian female agents. But, to be serious, all this provocative brouhaha over the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is being puffed up according to a scenario prepared in advance. The directors from the U.S. special services are playing out a detective show under the code-name: Those Cunning Russians -- Time of Action: The Present.

For the U.S. Administration, the atmosphere that is being created is unimportant. The world is demanding concrete steps in arms control, and not procrastination and pretexts. The White House is not ready to display political will, manifest new thinking, and underpin peacemaking assurances with actions.

This is rousing the indignation of the international public, and is even irritating the allies. In a word, the situation demands a distraction, a distraction in the guise of the latest anti-Soviet show.

In Act One, investigators from the French Surete discover a leak of information on the Ariane space rocket. It does not matter that the rocket is a failure and that nobody is interested in its secrets. Then the paper LIBERATION points the finger at the criminals -- look for them in the Russian Embassy. And, just before the curtain falls, the exposed diplomats are declared non grata.

But there is no storm of applause. All that is to be heard are the individual clapping of hired claques, as they call them in the U.S. But even they are drowned by indignant exclamations, hackneyed, clearly crude and unreliable.

But the show goes on: Act Two; scene of action -- Moscow, the new building of the U.S. Embassy. There, at home, those cunning Russians have smothered the entire premises with bugging equipment, the stuff that the FBI sets up everywhere in the United States to keep track of Americans. The drama grows: a small panic is arranged in the U.S. Congress and two legislators are urgently sent to Moscow to fan the flames. At the same time, yet another congressman demands that the embassy building in Moscow be demolished altogether. The drama approaches the climax: the act is not yet over, but the disappointed audience is unashamedly booing: old-hat, trite, unconvincing. The show has clearly flopped even before the final curtain.

The whipped up flame of anti-Sovietism has not yet settled down, but for the Western public, France, the United States, FRG and Britain, it is becoming clear who and for what purpose this show of little merit was organized. It was convenient, simply essential, to those forces that are striving in every way to poison relations with the Soviet Union; to provoke and stir up suspicion and mistrust toward the USSR; to kindle hostility, and in this atmosphere to shout at the top of their voices about the so-called Soviet threat, and torpedo all the USSR's initiatives aimed at preventing the threat of nuclear war, curbing the arms race, ensuring stability and security in the world.

[Lavrentyev] In confirmation of the points made by Igor Pavlovich, I want to quote a brief commentary in the U.S. paper THE BOSTON GLOBE. One must approach spy stories, the paper says, extremely critically. For any U.S. Government that is against detente with the Soviet Union, making a noise about the perfidy of the Soviets is the most natural way of undermining the possibility of improving relations. The paper recalls the fuss raised last summer when the Russians were accused of using alleged spy powder for tracking staff from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. A month or two later, the paper recalls, the whole story was simply forgotten. I think that the same thing also will happen to the present outburst of spy mania.

FOREIGN MINISTRY'S KOVALEV ON CONSULAR CRITICISM

PM181513 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by A. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister under the rubric "After IZVESTIYA Article": "New Standards for Consular Service"]

[Text] "Train From Paris, or Business Trip in an Emergency" published in IZVESTIYA No 35.

The above article justifiably seriously criticized cases of incorrect actions by consular section staffers at the Soviet Embassy in France. Essentially, the article touched on a large and very important problem -- the responsibility of Soviet diplomatic and consular representatives for protecting the honor, dignity, and security of Soviet citizens abroad.

The questions raised in the article were discussed in the collective of the Soviet Embassy in France, at a party meeting at the USSR Foreign Ministry Consular Administration, and at other collectives of the ministry's central apparatus and its foreign establishments. The theme of the discussions was how to rule out displays of callousness and bureaucratism with regard to Soviet citizens abroad.

The other day this question was examined at a USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium session to which Ya.P. Ryabov, Soviet ambassador to France, was invited. The collegium assessed the incident in Paris as disgraceful, particularly against the background of numerous examples of Soviet diplomatic and consular workers' conscientious execution of their official duty and selflessness and courage in defending the interests of the Soviet state and its citizens abroad.

What happened attests to shortcomings in the consular work of not only the Soviet Embassy in France. The collegium noted that the adoption of a number of prompt measures by no means indicates that the question can be considered closed. There also have been indications of other cases where staffers at Soviet missions abroad have failed to show proper consideration and tact when dealing with Soviet citizens.

The collegium demanded that the leaders of Soviet foreign establishments radically improve the USSR's consular services abroad and safeguard Soviet citizens' legitimate interests, seeing this as an important integral part of the restructuring of the ministry's activity. It was decided to carry out an in-depth check on the activity of the ministry's Consular Administration, including from the viewpoint of leaders' suitability for their positions. The entire range of questions linked with improving the Soviet consular service -- viewed in a broad and principled way -- will be specially examined in the USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium in the very near future.

FRENCH AWACS DEAL PART OF CLOSER TIES WITH NATO

PM031457 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko article under the "Pointed Remarks" rubric: "Aligning With NATO"]

[Text] A few days after Britain signed a contract with the U.S. company Boeing for six AWACS aircraft, France decided to buy three of these aircraft at a total cost of Fr5.75 billion. [paragraph continues]

These aircraft, modified versions of the Boeing 707 equipped with rotating radar, will be delivered in 1990. With refueling they can stay in the air for around 20 hours and can locate fighters, bombers, and missiles at a range of 300-800 km. In addition, they are used to coordinate military operations on the scale of an entire continent.

The French Defense Ministry is not hiding its satisfaction: The Air Force will finally be getting what it has wanted for many years. It has managed to overcome the resistance of those who cast doubt on the need to acquire the U.S. "flying radars" for two reasons: the high cost and the military and political consequences of such a move. According to Paris press reports, some specialists suggested building similar aircraft of their own 10 years ago but their opinion was not heeded. The other approach prevailed. French Defense Minister A. Giraud described this use of U.S. technology as an example of the form that cooperation between allies can take.

The deals struck in London and Paris have been greeted with great enthusiasm in the United States. Boeing has managed to sell AWACS aircraft at a time when it is coming under pressure in the civil airline market from the Airbus produced by a West European concern involving France, Britain, the FRG, and Spain. As "compensation," the Americans have promised -- mainly to shackle the French more securely -- to buy CFM-56 engines, produced jointly by the French firm Snecma and America's General Electric, for the Boeings and the KC-135 tanker aircraft. Lee Hessler, a Boeing director who was in Paris recently, stated that he is soon to open an office for his company here to study questions connected with possible French deliveries of equipment for the U.S. military industry, specifically for the "Star Wars" program.

The French acquisition of the AWACS aircraft has also met with a positive response at NATO headquarters. Until now the North Atlantic Alliance has had 18 such systems (the U.S. Air Force has a further 34), but its air fleet has now clearly increased. This deal, LE FIGARO stresses, is in line with NATO's intentions as it seeks to standardize the combat hardware adopted by the bloc's states. AWACS has already demonstrated that it is a "factor for rapprochement." During a recent visit to Paris, British Defense Secretary G. Younger reached an accord on joint training for the crews and technicians. According to LIBERATION, the equipping of the French Armed Forces with U.S. aircraft is not only of military but also political significance.

Hardly had the ink dried on the Boeing contract than France was holding the large-scale "Airex-87" exercises involving around 90 percent of its personnel and to which the NATO allies, including the United States, were invited. During the 11-day maneuvers, attended by the French president, joint operations were rehearsed with the aim of promoting "better mutual understanding" among the military.

However, by no means everyone is euphoric at the deal with Boeing. The decision to equip with AWACS systems may mean, L'HUMANITE notes, that the French Army may be under the command of a U.S. general one day. This is a dangerous policy which poses a threat to peace and is contrary to national interests, the newspaper notes. Increasingly often the country's public is expressing its concern at the fact that France is becoming actively involved in the North Atlantic Alliance's military structure.

In this regard, people here think of General de Gaulle, who took the country out of NATO's military organization in 1966 and did much to strengthen French independence and sovereignty to enable it to play an important role in world policy. How would he have reacted to the country's present involvement in the North Atlantic bloc's military organization? Many people are asking this question now, both inside France and abroad.

BOGACHEV QUESTIONS FRENCH DISARMAMENT STANCE

LD061342 Moscow TASS in English 1302 GMT 6 Apr 87

["Is France Against Nuclear Disarmament?" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 6 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev.

Whenever a prospect opens for the lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe, whenever there are real hopes for the reduction of nuclear arsenals in Europe, the present French Government comes out with statements about its "special stand" of non-participation in talks, its actual refusal to help bring closer the stands of the sides on nuclear disarmament. Whenever there is an opportunity to hamper the advance towards the lessening of the danger of nuclear war, the same "special independent stand" of Paris results in stubborn opposition to any initiatives aimed at the stabilisation of the military-political situation in Europe.

A month ago the Foreign Ministry of France expressed "dissatisfaction" over the Soviet Union's proposal for the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. The French Foreign Ministry declared that its aim is to prevent the emergence of non-nuclear Europe. And now French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, when interviewed by AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE pretended to know nothing about the Soviet Union's proposal on theatre missiles in Europe and actually supported the absurd proposals of hot heads in the Pentagon about transforming the U.S. Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1 missiles in return for the elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.

Trying to make himself sound more convincing, Raimond resorts to the terminology of chess and even recommends the U.S. Administration to ponder well before accepting the proposed gambit on medium-range missiles. The dangerous impasse that existed for long in the sphere of resolving the problem of nuclear arms reduction in Europe clearly suits the French foreign minister much more. It is also quite obvious, however, that Raimond's opening which envisages the preservation of U.S. "Pershings" in Europe might ultimately lead to the outcome unknown in the history of chess when both sides will turn out to be losers for nuclear war cannot be won.

FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY DIVISIONS AS CONGRESS OPENS

PM061147 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Bolshakov dispatch: "At the Socialists' Congress"]

[Text] Lille, 3 Apr -- The French Socialist Party's [PS] National Congress, attended by about 5,000 delegates and guests, opened in Lille today.

It is being held under conditions when the PS is no longer the ruling party, having lost power to the right wing at the last parliamentary elections, and when the bloc of left-wing forces no longer exists, a bloc which, as the French Communists noted, fell apart through the fault of the Socialists, who were making more and more concessions to the demands of big capital. Actually, on coming to power in March last year, the right wing did not gain complete power -- F. Mitterrand remains president of the republic until 1988, having been elected to that post by the PS.

The election defeat led to serious disorder within the PS. This was aggravated by the practice of "cohabitation" between the Socialist president and the right-wing government. The party's right wing headed by M. Rocard gained strength, and its supporters are now advocating an alliance with the centrists from the Union for French Democracy bloc of right-wing parties and the nomination of M. Rocard as the PS candidate for the next presidential elections. The factional struggle over the presidential candidate has particularly exacerbated the situation within the party at present. According to the latest public opinion polls, President F. Mitterrand enjoys the support of the majority of French people, up to 55 percent. His supporters, advocating Mitterrand's nomination as candidate for another term even though the president has up to now not officially given his consent, declare that should he do so Rocard would "have to withdraw his candidacy."

There are strong differences within the party ranks on international problems, especially France's approach to the problem of disarmament and the new Soviet initiative on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. A number of PS leaders, in particular First Secretary L. Jospin and former French Prime Minister L. Fabius, have recently expressed doubts regarding, for example, the advisability of continuing French nuclear tests. Left-wing socialists expressed support for a medium-range missile agreement under the slogan "Neither SS-20's nor Pershings!"

But the right wing holds virtually the same positions as the Chirac cabinet -- in favor of continuing the arms race and nuclear tests and the production of new types of nuclear and chemical weapons and against the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. In fact, there are virtually no differences between F. Mitterrand and J. Chirac on the question of French policy in the disarmament sphere.

The discussion of these questions, as well as problems of the country's socioeconomic situation and, in particular, unemployment and the decline of the population's purchasing power, will be the topics of debate at the congress.

Foreign delegations also are taking part in the forum of French socialists, including a CPSU delegation headed by V.V. Chikin, chief editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

Socialist Congress Ends

PM071621 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 87 First Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Bolshakov dispatch: "Congress Over"]

[Text] Lille, 5 Apr -- The Socialist Party national congress has concluded its work here. The party's leading organs have been elected, and L. Jospin has again become the first secretary. The concluding report, which he delivered today, the resolutions on the results of the work of the sections which discussed questions of French policy -- both domestic and foreign -- and the final "orientation document" define the main directions of the party's preparations for the 1988 presidential election.

In the domestic policy sphere the Socialists, as always, propose a program of change which does not affect the foundations of the capitalist system. Nevertheless, there is also much in this program that is attractive to the ordinary voter -- the widening of social programs, the slogan of creating new jobs, and so forth.

Definite progress has become apparent in the foreign policy area. The congress welcomed the broader cooperation with the socialist countries' ruling communist parties, primarily the CPSU, and recommended continued support for this cooperation and its wider range. The Socialists in fact advocated preserving France's nuclear potential, but within the limits necessary for defense. They dissociated themselves from the arms race program proclaimed by J. Chirac's government. A number of speakers voiced support for the USSR's peace initiatives, particularly M.S. Gorbachev's proposals to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

On the whole, the congress documents are very vague in nature, because they are the result of a very shaky compromise among different factions which even at the congress waged a struggle for leadership of the party and for the nomination of their "own people" for party posts.

UK TU DELEGATION ENDS VISIT; CHERNOBYL COMMENTS

PM071523 Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Apr 87 p 3

[I. Mikhaylov report: Strengthening Mutual Understanding"]

[Text] The official visit by a delegation from the British Trade Union Congress [TUC] General Council, which came to our country at the AUCCTU's invitation, has ended.

Talks were held in Moscow between a Soviet trade union delegation headed by S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the AUCCTU, and the TUC General Council delegation headed by F. Jarvis, its chairman.

The British guests met with representatives of the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation, the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Safe Working Practices in the Atomic Power Industry, the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, the USSR Ministry of Health, and the Academy of Medical Sciences. They also visted Kiev, where they were received by A.P. Lyashko, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers. The delegation members were given a detailed description of the measures taken to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. The delegation visited the AES region, where meetings took place with representatives of the station's administration and trade union committee.

At the end of the visit, a news conference was held in Moscow and was opened by G.I. Yanayev, secretary of the AUCCTU.

The delegation members gave journalists their impressions of their meetings with Soviet people. F. Jarvis, chairman of the TUC General Council and chairman of the TUC's special committee on nuclear energy, said that the delegation had an opportunity to familiarize itself in detail with the measures that are being taken to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. "The Soviet experience will be very important for all the states developing a nuclear power industry," he stated. "The information that we obtained will form the basis of a detailed report which we will be presenting to the next TUC congress."

The delegation members noted that fabrications have been spread in their country about the causes of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. In particular, Dr David Leigh stated: "It is quite obvious tha the catastrophe happened not because of technical factors but because of gross errors by the station's personnel. We were impressed by the speed and efficiency with which the aftereffects of the accident were eliminated. The radiation situation is now so satisfactory that we were able to visit the station without fear."

The delegation members stressed the need for international cooperation in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Delegation head F. Jarvis expressed the intention to invite a Soviet trade union delegation to pay a return visit to Britain to exchange opinions on power industry matters.

Closing the news conference, G.I. Yanayev, secretary of the AUCCTU, noted that the delegation's visit made it possible to hold a frank and constructive exchange of opinions on questions of interest to the sides and was useful for promoting mutual understanding and strengthening relations between the two countries' trades unions.

The TUC General Council delegation has left for home It was seen off at the airport by S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the AUCCTU; G.I. Yanayev, secretary of the AUCCTU; and B.A. Averyanov, chief of the AUCCTU international department.

ANTONOV, FRG'S BANGEMANN DISCUSS ECONOMIC TIES

PM071405 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Session Concluded"]

[Text] Bonn, 3 Apr -- The 15th session of the USSR-FRG Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, held under the chairmanship of FRG Economics Minister M. Bangemann, ended its work here today. The Soviet delegation was headed by A.K. Antonov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The Soviet delegation head was received by and had conversations with FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl and FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher. Opinions were exchanged on a broad range of political questions, including questions of the further development of USSR-FRG bilateral relations.

The sides reached the unanimous opinion that the active utilization of new forms of mutually advantageous cooperation, such as production sharing and the creation of joint enterprises, can produce new incentives to the development of USSR-FRG economic relations. In this context, the Soviet delegation briefed the West German side on the restructuring now underway in the sphere of the economy and foreign economic ties in the USSR.

FRG BANKER INTERVIEWED ON USSR TRADE PROSPECTS

PM061357 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 3 Apr 87 p 3

[Interview with Dresdner Bank Chairman Wolfgang Roeller by own correspondent G. Gavrilkin under the rubric "Business Links": "Favorable Prospects"]

[Text] Bonn -- A routine session of the USSR and FRG committee on economic and scientific-technical cooperation began in Bonn yesterday. Our own correspondent in the FRG asked Wolfgang Roeller, chairman of the Dresdner Bank, to answer a few questions.

[Gavrilkin] Mr Roeller, what is your opinion of the present state of Soviet-West German trade and economic relations?

[Roeller] Trade has often played a stabilizing role in ties between our countries -- in the mid-eighties it reached a record level of DM25 billion. Last year there was a reduction of more than 20 percent. The chief reason for this was the fall in raw material prices on world markets -- in fact, your country remains one of the main suppliers of oil, petroleum products, and gas.

At the same time, both in the USSR and the FRG there is keen interest in the further intensification of bilateral economic ties. Therefore, I am firmly convinced that the recent slump was a passing phenomenon, and the foreign economic activity reform that has been conducted in the Soviet Union since the beginning of the year and the authorization to set up enterprises using joint capital certainly will have a positive impact on their development.

[Gavrilkin] What part can the current commission session play in this regard?

[Roeller] The session is discussing opportunities for further cooperation. Attention is focused on the foreign economic reform in the USSR and the statute on joint enterprises.

[Gavrilkin] What tasks is the FRG's second-biggest bank setting itself?

[Roeller] As far as the Soviet Union is concerned we see it as our task first and foremost to contribute to broadening its economic links with West Germany, which will become even more diverse in the future than they are now, accompanying their development with the elaboration of relevant financing models. We are seeking to inform West German firms of changes in the USSR and pave the way for them to cooperate with your country. We intend, for example, to send more experts to our bank's office in Moscow, which, incidentally, 14 years ago was the first Western bank office in the Soviet Union.

[Gavrilkin] Mr Roeller, this year you will become cochairman of the commission's banking working group. Can we expect anything new from this group in the immediate future?

[Roeller] Its next meeting is in September in Duesseldorf. There we will be discussing current developments in the international financial markets. This will involve an examination of its possible influence on Soviet-West German economic ties in view of the recent development of events in the USSR.

RAZUMOVSKIY ATTENDS AUSTRIAN COMMUNISTS CONGRESS

Seen Off at Airport

LD262323 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Mar 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] On the invitation of the leadership of the Communist Party of Austria, a CPSU Central Committee delegation headed by Comrade Razumovskiy has left Moscow for Vienna today to participate in the 26th congress of Austrian Communists. The delegation was seen off at the airport by Comrade Medvedev and senior employees of the CPSU Central Committee. [video shows Razumovskiy accompanied by two unidentified men walking to the aircraft, shaking hands; Razumovskiy boarding the plane along with other unidentified men and a total of seven officials waving goodbye]

Arrival in Vienna

LD262002 Moscow TASS in English 1859 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna March 26 TASS -- A CPSU delegation headed by secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Georgiy Razumovskiy, arrived in Vienna today to attend the 26th congress of the Communist Party of Austria at the invitation of the CPA leadership.

The delegation was welcomed at the capital's international Schwechat Airport by Franz Muhri, chairman of the Communist Party of Austria [CPA], and Hans Steiner, member of the CPA Central Committee and head of the CPA CC International Department.

Activities in Austria

PM031049 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "CPSU Delegation in Austria"]

[Text] Vienna, 31 Mar -- On 30 March the CPSU delegation headed by G.P. Razumovskiy, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, toured Lower Austria -- a major industrial region on whose territory the country's capital is located. The delegation, which is here at the invitation of the Communist Party of Austria [KPOE], attended the 26th KPOE Congress.

The delegation visited the cities of Korneuburg and Stockerau, where it acquainted itself with the Heid machine building plant and inspected machine tools and agricultural machinery produced there. The firm exports some of its output to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet guests were warmly greeted by (Ottokar Indrikh), chairman of the board of the Heid company. He noted that the company made its first deliveries to the USSR in 1926, more than 60 years ago.

G.P. Razumovskiy spoke about the restructuring processes which are underway in the Soviet Union in all areas of life and noted the importance of further deepening trade and economic ties between the Soviet Union and Austria. He pointed out the great importance in this context of the sides' existing rich traditions and accumulated experience.

The information about the restructuring of the USSR's foreign economic activity attracted much interest.

Conversations were held with the management and workers of the company's enterprises.

The delegation also visited the Stetteldorf community and inspected a farm specializing in raising pedigree livestock.

On 30 March the CPSU delegation met F. Muhri, chairman of the KPOE, W. Silbermayr and H. Kalt, members of the Politburo and secretaries of the KPOE Central Committee; and J. Steiner and E. Scharf, members of the KPOE Central Committee. The representatives of the two parties exchanged views on a number of topical international problems, emphasizing the special importance of questions regarding the struggle for peace and ending the nuclear arms race and the rallying in this struggle of communist parties and all peace-loving forces. Questions of the international communist and workers movement were also discussed.

Vienna, 31 Mar -- G.P. Razumovskiy, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who headed the CPSU delegation which attended the 26th KPOE Congress, met with the aktiv of workers at Soviet institutions in Austria at the USSR Embassy in Vienna today and briefed them on the tasks stemming from the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum. Tasks facing Soviet foreign affairs and foreign trade organizations at the present stage were discussed.

CPSU CC Greetings

PM301140 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 87 First Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee message: "To the 26th Communist Party of Austria Congress"]

[Text] Dear comrades,

We cordially greet the delegates to the 26th Congress of the fraternal Communist Party of Austria [KPOE] and wish the congress successful and fruitful work.

Soviet Communists invariably follow with sincere sympathy the KPOE's activity in defense of the vital interests of Austria's working people and highly value its efforts to ensure that Austria, on the basis of the status of permanent neutrality and its position at the center of our continent, makes a weighty contribution to the cause of detente and the strengthening of mutual understanding between the peoples of Europe.

The times we are living through demand from communists more than ever before the ability to find new approaches to the solution of the major and complex problems which mankind encounters today, to make effective use of the potential opening up for this purpose, and still more convincingly to show the working people the decisive advantages of the socialist alternative.

We are confident that your congress and its decisions will be an important milestone along this path and that they will play a weighty role in the mobilization of Austria's Communists in the struggle for peace and social progress and will help increase the KPOE's prestige among the country's left-wing democratic public.

For our part we assure you of the unchanging solidarity of the Soviet Union's Communists and that our party will continue to strengthen in every way the bonds of friendship which traditionally bind the CPSU and the KPOE.

With communist greetings,

The CPSU Central Committee.

Razumovskiy Addresses Congress

PM011521 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent B. Dubrovin and TASS correspondent A. Tyupayev dispatch: "Tasks of Austrian Communists"]

[Text] Vienna, 28 Mar -- The 26th Communist Party of Austria [KPOE] Congress is continuing work. [paragraph continues]

The delegates are discussing the Central Committee report, reports from the control, finance, and other commissions, the activity of party organizations, and Communists' tasks in stepping up ideological and political work both inside and outside the party. The delegates devoted great attention to the need to sharply step up the party's work in the trade unions, women's organizations, and among young people.

The speakers stressed the need to further strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations with the fraternal communist and workers parties on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism. It was particularly noted that party organizations today are showing sincere interest in the restructuring taking place in the Soviet Union, and this creates favorable opportunities for stepping up KPOE activity and attracting new members to its ranks. In this regard, the delegates pointed out, the KPOE leadership should not only brief the party more extensively than at present about the processes taking place in the Soviet Union and the CPSU, but should creatively apply Soviet Communists' experience to Austrian conditions.

The congress delegates listened with great attention to the speeches by representatives of the fraternal communist and workers parties attending the 26th KPOE Congress.

G.P. Razumovskiy, head of the CPSU delegation and CPSU Central Committee secretary, took the floor. The congress delegates greeted with applause his statement that Soviet Communists follow with great attention and interest the lives and struggle of like-minded people abroad. On behalf of the CPSU delegation he thanked the KPOE for the invitation to attend the forum. We view this invitation, G.P. Razumovskiy said, as an expression of the sense of international solidarity among Communists struggling for the common cause.

The speaker dwelt briefly on what is happening in our country. This year marks the 70th anniversary of Soviet power. In this time our people have traveled a long and difficult road. Socialism's successes in economic, social, and spiritual development on a broad historical level are common knowledge and indisputable. Socialism has shown itself to be a great creative force that actively and effectively influences the course of events in the international arena.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that there are no unsolved problems or contradictions in our society. Such a claim would accord neither with Marxist-Leninist theory nor with specific practice. At a certain stage development rates slowed, unfavorable trends began to emerge in the social and spiritual sphere, and stagnation and other phenomena alien to socialism came to light.

The main cause of these negative processes -- and, on behalf of the Politburo, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated this quite frankly at the January Plenum this year -- lies in the fact that primarily because of subjective reasons the need for change and the danger of the growth of negative phenomena in society were not fully assessed in good time and a clear-cut line of overcoming such phenomena and making fuller use of the potential inherent in the socialist system was not worked out.

In this atmosphere, the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum critically analyzed the state of affairs and advocated the acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development and changes and transformations in Soviet society on the basis of socialism and the comprehensive activation of the human factor.

The concept of acceleration and the achievement of a new quality of life in all areas -- economic, social, and spiritual -- was the main theme running through the documents and materials of the 27th CPSU Congress, held slightly over a year ago, and through subsequent party resolutions.

The CPSU Central Committee January Plenum deepened the analysis of the situation, assessed the first results of the implementation of the strategic course of acceleration, and strengthened convictions about the irreversible nature of restructuring. The plenum adopted decisions that will determine for many years the CPSU's activity aimed at ensuring changes in society and revealing to the fullest extent the creative potential of socialism in the interests of all Soviet people.

The CPSU, the speaker stated, sees the widest participation by working people in the implementation of our plans, the further democratization of Soviet society, a break with the stereotyped thinking and action that prevailed in the past, and the rejection of conservative approaches -- that is, everything we call restructuring -- as the guarantee of the successful implementation of our plans. More socialism and more democracy are what restructuring means.

The head of the CPSU delegation noted that Soviet society is now experiencing a period of profound changes and activation of its entire social life. Soviet people are supporting restructuring with action. Initial results already show that restructuring is real and necessary. It is necessary because, as we are well aware, our difficulties and mistakes have a detrimental effect on the activity of the fraternal parties in other countries, including your work. It is necessary because the state of our national economy, the development of science and technology, and the buildup of Soviet society's spiritual and intellectual potential are decisive factors in strengthening the USSR's positions in the international arena and its struggle to eliminate the threat of war.

Now, when the world is jam-packed with nuclear missiles and mankind is teetering on the brink of self-destruction, the task of maintaining peace has taken on entirely new dimensions and, correspondingly, must be resolved in a different way. Recognition of this fact requires new political thinking and a new approach to the problems of ensuring security in the world on the basis of the interests of all mankind and its survival.

These are the principles by which our country is guided in international affairs. They form the basis of the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which put forward a comprehensive program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

The prohibition of nuclear weapons tests could be the first real step along the road to the implementation of this goal. The Soviet Union has shown through its own example that it is prepared to take that route: Silence reigned at Soviet nuclear test ranges for 569 days. In response to this step, there were 26 nuclear explosions in the United States.

Our country put forward a specific plan for creating a nuclear-free world at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. This peace challenge was not accepted by the U.S. President, although the leaders of the world's two most important powers were virtually a step away from agreement. However, after Reyjkavik it became clear to many ordinary people and politicians in various countries that a door had been half-opened to a world without nuclear weapons and that a nuclear-free world was not an illusion but an entirely possible reality.

On 28 February this year the Soviet Union put forward another important initiative, proposing that a separate agreement envisaging the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe be immediately concluded. On signing this agreement, the USSR is prepared to withdraw from the GDR and the CSSR, by agreement with those countries' governments, the increased-range operational and tactical missiles which, as is well known, were sited in those countries in response to the deployment of U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe.

This is clearly yet another act of goodwill that has evoked a widespread positive response among the peoples of Europe and in the United States and other countries. However, in this regard it also must be said that, as always, our new proposals do not suit the opponents of the elimination of nuclear weapons, and they are resorting to their usual simple method of claiming some kind of imaginary Soviet military superiority. But I think that this time it will be hard to brush aside the Soviet proposals.

In conclusion, G.P. Razumovskiy wished Austrian Communists successes in fulfilling the decisions which the party forum will make, and read out the CPSU Central Committee greetings to the 26th KPOE Congress.

Congress delegates and representatives of the fraternal parties spoke at the evening session.

Austrian CP Congress Ends

PM021455 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 87 First Edition p 6

[Special PRAVDA and TASS correspondents B. Dubrovin and A. Tyupayev report under the general rubric "Communists in the Front Ranks of the Struggle": "Defending the Interests of the Working People"]

[Text] Vienna, 29 Mar -- The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of Austria [KPOE] ended today. Franz Muhri, chairman of the KPOE, delivered the concluding speech.

An important event in the congress proceedings was the adoption of the documents. The resolution "For Labor and Peace Together with the Communist Party of Austria" notes that now, more than ever before, safeguarding peace is the key question affecting the future of mankind.

The KPOE welcomes and supports the great process of restructuring which is underway in the Soviet Union and also the positive changes, progress, and successes achieved in building socialism in other countries. The congress welcomed the foreign policy conducted by the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

One section of the document is devoted to problems of political, ideological, and organizational work and to increasing the party's cohesion.

The congress also adopted an appeal to the public of the country which details the further development of the Austrian Communists' activities for the sake of ensuring the right to work, social justice, peace, detente, disarmament, and greater freedom and democracy for the working people. This policy is to counter the policy of the "grant coalition" which has recently come to power.

Elections to the KPOE Central Committee and other leading party organs were held.

When the agenda of the 26th Congress of the KPOE was exhausted, the proletarian anthem -- the Internationale -- rang out in the hall.

The first plenum of the party's newly elected Central Committee met and discussed organizational questions. Franz Muhri was reelected chairman of the KPOE. A new KPOE Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat were elected.

The CPSU Delegation headed by G.P. Razumovskiy, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which took part in the congress, placed flowers at the monument on Schwartzenbergplatz, in the center of the Austrian capital, to the Soviet servicemen who died during the fighting for Austria's liberation in the spring of 1945.

Members of the delegation also visited the Vienna central cemetery, where they laid flowers on the graves of Soviet officers and men. Flowers were also placed on the grave of J. Koplenig, a prominent figure in the Austrian and international communist movement who was chairman of the KPOE for many years.

Razumovskiy Departs Vienna

LD010013 Moscow TASS in English 1626 GMT 31 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna March 31 TASS -- A CPSU delegation led by Georgiy Razumovskiy, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which attended the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of Austria (CPA) at the invitation of the party's Central Committee, left Vienna for home today.

At Schwechat International Airport the delegation was seen off by Franz Muhri, chairman of the Communist Party of Austria, Hans Steiner, member of the CPA Central Committee and chief of the International Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee, and also by Gennadiy Shikin, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Austria.

CORRECTION TO TASS REPORT ON FRENCH SPY SATELLITE

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Satellite, Anti-USSR Campaign," published in the 7 April Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page G 2, in the sourceline and in paragraph one, line one:

LD062258 Moscow TASS in English 2240 GMT 6 Apr 87; [Text] Paris April 6 TASS... (changing date to 6 April)

YELTSIN ADDRESSES MOSCOW CITY SOVIET 14 MARCH

PM071101 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Mar 87 pp 2-3

[Unattributed report on 14 March speech by B.N. Yeltsin, first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom, at 10th session of Moscow City Soviet, 19th Convocation, under the general heading "Deputies Make Proposals, Criticize, Advise"]

[Text] Comrade Deputies! Probably all of you have heard the phrase: "Why campaign for Soviet power?" This is said about something which goes without saying. Indeed,d the concepts of "socialism," "Soviet power," and "democracy" live in our consciousness so naturally that many people do not think about their specific content and their original essence. However, at a crucial stage in our history, in the period of restructuring in the spirit of revolutionary transformations and renewal of all aspects of society's life, we now turn to what is most important -- the mighty force of socialist people's power which is not being fully tapped.

This is why even today we must campaign for Soviet power. Campaign by our actions, seeking a new quality of work from all the components of Soviet power: the session and the ispolkom, standing commissions and main administrations, rayspolkoms and deputies' groups, and each deputy and apparatus worker.

As the Central Committee January Plenum stressed, we must put an end once and for all to paralyzed understanding and protracted stagnation in realizing self-government of the people. While openly admitting that the keystones of socialist democracy have been subject to perceptible corrosion and deformation, we must return to them the basis of trust and authority among working people.

Would it not be the most flagrant distortion of the essence of our democracy if the Moscow Gorispolkom -- which is obliged to report annually -- had not reported to the session for the last 30 years?

Is it really right that deputies have had to force their way, and indeed today frequently have to force their way through ispolkom officials as supplicants and not as authorized elected people's representatives? Is it not for this reason that when they encounter apathy, formalism, and red tape among the representatives of power, Muscovites have turned more frequently to any bodies rather than their own deputies and the ispolkom services with their needs?

Since the 26th party congress, which frankly appraised the failures in the activity of the ispolkom and the main administration, improvements have occurred. There is patently more specific action. The solicitous hand of the Moscow Soviet has touched on many chronic problems. Obviously, matters have also been affected by the fact that the functions of the gorkoms and ispolkom have been more clearly demarcated, the scope of independence has been extended, the Soviet's party group has been aroused, and help has been given with the renewal of cadres. However, it must be admitted self-criticially that the party gorkom and raykoms do not always skillfully ensure the political leadership of local soviets, primarily via the communist working in them.

The party gorkom bureau believes that the present session will be a turning point in the restructuring and renewal of the city's public life. It will provide an active impetus for the work of the ispolkom and all working organs of the Moscow Soviet.

The nonstandardized preparation for the session has promoted this. The basic reporting materials and Muscovites' opinions were published well in advance and discussed in a number of labor collectives and on the pages of the city's newspapers. Not only apparatus employees, but also some deputies were involved in elaborating the draft decision. This made it possible to make the report more substantive and businesslike.

In his report Gorispolkom Chairman V.T. Saikin, cited several figures and facts on the positive changes that have been planned and that have occurred. It also contained critical analysis.

Comprising the one with the other, we still cannot fail to notice the desire to show big improvements and highlight the positive elements, and to convince oneself and other people of this. These are echoes of what is past, an echo it might seem of the inflated self appraisals which have been rejected for ever. It is the Muscovites themselves who provide the most objective opinion about the ispolkom and the end results of its work. Their appraisal differs greatly from the opinion of the city leaders.

Judging by the numerous meetings with Muscovites and the never decreasing flood of letters, complaints, and critical remarks in the press, people have not felt substantial changes. Sometimes new approaches to the solution of problems are seen, but no perceptible changes are being felt in the distribution of housing, in trade, in health care, or in transport. Only the desire to emerge from stagnation is being noted, but not as yet the way out. Only the intention to improve the management structure of municipal services, but not as yet any real improvement. The ispolkom is timid in getting down to coordinating the utilization of the resources and capacities of Moscow enterprises. They usually appear at ministries most frequently in the role of supplicants. In brief, the energy of ideas has not been released into the energy of actions. The preconditions have failed to become actuality.

We must not deviate at all from the criteria set by the January plenum, where M.S. Gorbachev said: "People will judge our policy and restructuring -- and the further we progress the more strictly they will judge -- by tangible results." Moscovites await these results with impatience.

Life sets the ispolkom a diversity of tasks. Resolving them demands a considerable increase in the standard of work of the Moscow Soviet and its ispolkom, which presupposes the persistent implementation of the recently adopted party and government resolutions on increasing the soviets' role and responsibility for accelerating socioeconomic development. A reliable foundation has been laid here to ensure that the Moscow Soviet becomes the true master of the city.

In its renewed composition the ispolkom has been operating for a little over a year, and some of its members only for a few months. However, the rhythm of social transformations allows no time for footdragging and leisurely "settling in," so to speak.

The deputies have sharply criticized the ispolkom leaders today. The shortcomings noted in the ispolkom's work are the result of extremely slow changes. It must be said bluntly that mental restructuring in the ispolkom is dragging on.

It is this, in the opinion of the party gorkom bureau, that is delaying growth in the organizational influence of the gorispolkom in resolving topical and long-term questions of socioeconomic acceleration in the capital and has failed to raise the prestige of the people's organ as necessary.

When the ispolkom will finally become a collective of like-minded, competent, and active people depends largely on Ispolkom Chairman Comrade Saykin. We hope the main elements of its work will be not "on the carpet" summonses and a severe tone, but businesslike consultations, trust, and strict but tactful accountability. Leaders must be studied more deeply and substantively and tested in practical work. "A leader is answerable not just for how he leads, but also for the actions of those he leads," V.I. Lenin said.

The improvement of the cadre situation in a number of gorispolkom administrations and departments is being pursued indecisively and with caution. This process is unfolding particularly painfully in the services under the jurisdiction of Comrade Kozyrev-Dal, first deputy chairman of the ispolkom and chairman of the City Agro-Industrial Committee, and Deputy Chairman Comrade Kostenko.

Much has been said today about the shortcomings in the work of Comrade Kozyrev-Dal. It is a pity that we have not heard from him how matters will be rectified.

The situation with Comrade Kostenko is just as complex. He must reserve fewer questions for himself personally, trust his subordinates more, not fetter their initiative, and more resolutely tackle urgent cadre replacements. Then there will probably be fewer unfulfilled promises on housing questions, and indeed time will be found for the leadership of the law enforcement organs.

Much remains to be done in other sectors of work as well.

Since reporting to the Moscow Soviet party group Comrade Ulezlo, deputy chairman of the ispolkom, has somewhat stepped up his activity. It has been insufficient for a long time. Currently he is patently insufficiently consistent in achieving end results. A real change in the leadership of the transport main administrations has still not occurred.

It is high time Deputy Chairman Comrade Zharov stopped hoping for a "helping hand" from party organs in questions of trade organization, changed his style of work, and displayed more efficiency and liveliness in introducing progressive forms of supply and services for Muscovites.

Yet another deputy chairman -- Comrade Yershov -- is failing to display proper initiative in work. He has not succeeded in ensuring the efficient operation of the city's power services. As a result breakdowns in main heating and gas pipelines have been permitted. We are still not experiencing any major changes in the saving of resources in the city -- he is responsible for this in the ispolkom.

Without deferring matters, we must give a collegial appraisal of work in the postcongress period and of the capacity for restructuring of all leading cadres in the Moscow Soviet system. I believe that -- in connection with the recently adopted resolution -- it is necessary to carry out certification of cadres in the soviets' apparatus more systematically and strictly. As yet this work, which is lead by Ispolkom Secretary Comrade Prokofyev, has not produced the expected results.

The fundamental question of improving the style of soviet's work means bringing it closer to the affairs of labor collectives, housing complexes, and rayons. The regulation of relations between the gorispolkom and rayispolkoms has long been urgent. In many matters there is still duplication, substitution, and sometimes even disputes over spheres of influence here. The ispolkom got down to this work and enlisted science only recently. Time does not stand still. Actions must be more vigorous and purposeful.

Many rayispolkom chairmen still describe the style of leadership from above mainly as technocratic and administrative.

Rayons' proposals for tackling urgent problems often "get lost" on the endless path of accords and coordination and in a majority of cases fail to be taken into account by the gorispolkom and main administrations.

In this regard ispolkom leaders descend to "grassroots" level extremely rarely, preferring to summon people to them in their offices, at times breaking regulations. Visiting ispolkom sittings in the rayons to comprehensively examine problems of their development is not practiced at all. Even at rayon soviet sessions, deputy chairmen are rare visitors. Last year they were not seen in one out of three rayons. The Moscow Soviet representatives among the main administration and administration chiefs conduct themselves passively and keep quiet at sessions. They exert virtually no influence on the preparation or conduct of sessions.

Assistance for the rayons is patently insufficient. For example, a year has elapsed since the adoption by the gorispolkom of a decision to improve the comprehensive development of Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon. Once again there have been failures to meet targets. Nine installations failed to be included in the plan. If it was unrealistic, why were they included in the decision and why were the rayon leadership and the voters given hope? Certain rayons have lagged behind particularly in the social sphere and require heightened attention.

Serious consideration must be given to the extension of the responsibility and rights of the rayon component.

Perhaps the rayispolkoms should be allocated a definite ceiling of capital investments to build a number of priority facilities based on their own itemized lists? Maybe rayons should be given the rights of a client, the right to determine for themselves a list of construction projects which they need?

As for construction where many problems have accumulated, Gorispolkom Deputy Chairmen Comrades Arzhanov and Shilobreyev must be told what is wanted: That it is time to overcome confusion and uncertainty, to display more coherence and precision in coordinating subordinate main administrations, and to systematically remove "hiccups" in the construction process. Great hopes have been pinned on you. The time has come to justify them.

In conditions of the restructuring of the economy and the introduction of new management methods, the responsibility of soviet organs for the state of affairs in industry, and not just local industry, is increasing.

The Moscow and the rayon soviets must investigate matters more deeply and exert a real influence on solving problems of improving product quality, introducing state acceptance, switching enterprises to self-capitalizing and self-financing, and utilizing the potential of scientific organizations for the city's needs. The soviets are showing themselves to be patently timid here, obviously believing this is the concern of the party gorkom alone.

From July the city's industry will switch to a two-and three-shift system of work. Are the ispolkom and its services doing everything to ensure that when Muscovites change their usual system, no problems arise connected with the operation of trade enterprises, the services sphere, public education, or transport?

To put it bluntly, there has not been proper attention to the switch to a multishift system. The standing commissions have not studied the state of affiars substantively and the question is only in the planning tage at the ispolkom sitting. Measures connected with the switch to a two-shift system have only been examined by one in four rayispolkoms.

This is not a local problem and cannot be solved straight off in the "ordinary run of work." Delay, sluggishness, and lack of deliberation can discredit a great state matter. Coping with this task means displaying political maturity.

Muscovites have pledged to fulfill the 12th 5-Year Plan targets with fewer workers. To act not by force of numbers, but by skill. A party gorkom plenum adopted a simple decision on this score last October. As yet the ispolkom has no clear system of organization for recording and utilizing labor resources. City Planning Commission leaders are sometimes even making concessions to a number of ministries and departments which are planning not a reduction but an increase in the number of workers at enterprises under their jurisdiction.

City Planning Commission Chairman Comrade Bystrov must see the wood beyond the trees and display efficiency, primarily in tackling major long-term questions of planning and assimilating economic levers for managing the city's development. This demands greater collegiality and soundness in work and scientific substantiation of adopted decisions.

At all events questions of improving the leadership of socioeconomic acceleration frequently foundered on shortcomings in the ispolkom's work style.

The quality and effectiveness of its decisions are being improved only slowly. Many of them do not designate specific executors and deadlines, and questions of financing, resources, and documentation are studied only superficially. Monitoring of execution is unreliable and as a result repeat and duplicate decisions are taken.

Despite a 25 percent reduction in gorispolkom decisions, the number of rulings, instructions, and other documents has sharply increased. As a result the gross paper output "from Gorkiy Street" is 1.2 times in excess of what it was before. Talk is still frequently divorced from action.

This means that more decisive measures are needed, not just to rule out a slide into previous shortcomings in leadership style, but also to make it possible to completely overcome bureaucratism, a superficial approach, lack of specificity, and evasion of critical questions.

The most reliable means to achieve this and the guarantee of an irreversible restoration of the atmosphere in the Moscow Soviet must be the broad democratization of its work. Primarily, the boosting of the role of the standing commissions and their influence of cadre selection, the preparation and adoption of decisions, and monitoring of execution.

The role of the commissions is still manifestly less than it should be. Suffice it so say that in 1986 less than 10 percent of the questions examined at gorispolkom sittings were prepared with their participation. For more than 6 years now none of the commissions have reported at the session.

The chairmen of a number of commissions, including Comrades Levshin (Transport and Communications), Likhushin (Power Services), and Grishin (Housing) have an indifferent and compromising attitude to the fact that the ispolkom administrations and departments fail to bother themselves even with giving timely answers to the questions put by the commissions. This violation of the legislation on the activity of deputies' commissions results in a failure to fulfill almost half their decisions. Not one of the standing commissions has used its powers to inquire at the session about the reasons for the disrespectful attitude to their recommendations on the part of the main administrations, economic leaders, and the ispolkom secretary and deputy chairman.

Some leaders of ispolkom services who are also deputies -- for example Comrade Bibichev, chief of the Chemical Industry Administration; Comrade Goryachev, chief of the Prices Department; and Comrade Ploshchanskiy, chief of the Movie Theater Provision Administration -- have quite simply evaded work in the commissions.

Why is this permitted? Why is it considered tolerable when certain deputies grace one or two commission sittings a year with their presence, and some commissions have never met at full strength at all? Is it a lack of civic activeness and practical democratic skills? Obviously inertia and a sense of arbitrariness and futility in their work has taken root in many deputies also as a result of the arrogant and scornful attitude to the commissions of a number of ispolkom members. They -- including some deputy chairmen -- forget about their responsibility to the commissions. They themselves only rarely attend sittings, decide cadre questions without agreement in the commission, make it possible for employees in their secretariats to keep quiet, and allow city organizations and union republic ministries to ignore appeals and proposals of the commissions.

It is time to radically restructure the activity of the deputies' commissions and to return to them their real rights and powers which have been usurped by the apparatus.

On the eve of the session party gorkom workers had a talk with 113 deputies. A large number -- 80 -- of our collocutors were worker-deputies. It is pleasing that most of them have a sincere desire to work in a new way and totally justify the trust of voters.

Here is something to put us on the alert. More than 100 deputies noted that they were not involved in the preparation of sessions, including the present session. One in two deputies failed to receive specific help from anybody.

Almost all of them unanimously pointed up the arrogance still to be found in the ispolkom apparatus regarding deputies and the vicious habit of seeing a deputy as an importunate supplicant or executor at the beck and call of "their majesty the apparatus worker."

"We cannot regard the poor level of information and the lack of openness and feedback from the gorispolkom as a normal phenomenon. A deputy prepares information or makes his proposals, but how and where they are examined, where they are included, and what measures are adopted on them - nobody knows. Order must be imposed here," Comrade Kosyakov, sector chief at the "Pamyati Revolyutsii 1905" Plant stressed.

According to Comrade Martazova, teacher at the No 579 School; Comrade Uralova, a regulator at a science-and-production association; and a number of other deputies, they are -- as they say -- left to stew in their own juice. No training has been organized and there is no information. The deputy chairmen are as inaccessible as mountain peaks.

The old methods are still operating -- we will decide ourselves without the deputies and for the deputies. But the question "who works for whom?" must be resolved simply in favor of the deputies.

A system of deputies working with ispolkom leaders and services, in which a deputy could alwasy obtain a necessary consultation or resolve a question, must be organized and made to work without hitches. There is such experience in the country. It must be introduced.

There have been no substantial improvements in the practice of deputies' requests and voters' mandates.

Let us be completely honest. Six requests per 1,000 deputies last year, and moreover carefully prepared in offices but not fulfilled in full, can be described as "democracy just for the record." The formalistic attitude to deputies' requests must be called more strictly into account.

The ispolkom is also neglecting work with mandates. One in five mandates have not been fulfilled in the reporting period. In five rayons none of them have been realized in the past year. So there is a real debt to the million voters in these rayons. Four hundred deputies have no mandates at all. Mandates must not be understood simply as an assignment to build something costly. Why should the deputies not take on organizational work with the population to maintain the housing stock? This is patently a neglected matter in the city. A mandate might also be a commission to organize a youth club or sports section, to hold a subbotnik, or to help an invalid. Out of all the mandates under the control of the Moscow Soviet, almost one in two are "carried over" to the following convocation. Perhaps partly because under the guise of a mandate the ispolkoms that have inspired it have been counting on appropriations and funds in excess of the plan. Why does nobody bear personal responsibility for failure to realize voters' mandates?

There can only be one political appraisal of such a situation: The leaders of ispolkom subdivisions have failed to assimilate the demands for democratization and forget about their responsibility to the deputies and voters, by whose authority they were promoted to official offices and may with every right be remove from the leader's chair.

It is also time to remind some deputies of their responsibility to the voters. Especially the 300 deputies, mostly leaders, who have been wearing the Moscow Soviet badge for more than 3 convocations. And 126 deputies have been wearing it for 5 or more convocations. Only a few of them can report specific actions to Muscovites. We do not need "people who go through the motions" now. Their time has gone for ever. Being a people'd deputy is by no means an automatic prelude to office, but serious work reequiring self-sacrifice, sympathetic attentiveness to every voter, active involvement, and real action.

It is unjustified that one in three Moscow Soviet deputies have a set of three or more other public assignments. What is all this for? For a showy testimonial? For an article in an encyclopaedia?

For more than 10 years (5 convocations) Comrade Stanis, rector of the People's Friendship University, has been elected a deputy of the Moscow Soviet. What is he preparing to report to voters, when he has virtually done no work in the Standing Commission on Youth Affairs and taken no part in the preparation of questions? The mandate he was given has not been fulfilled. He attended only two out of seven sittings of the territorial deputies' group last year.

The following have been peoples' deputies in name only for several convocations -- Comrade Izyumov, first deputy chief editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA; Comrade Kasyanov, RSFSR deputy minister of education; Comrade Sizov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Cinematography; Comrade Tkachenko, deputy chief of a USSR ministry of the Automotive Industry main administration; Comrade Trusov, Moscow transport procurator; and Comrade Yudashkin, chief of a Ministry of Civil Aviation administration. I do not know what they are hoping for at the next elections this year.

As you know, in accordance with the guidelines of the 27th party congress and the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum, a number of changes to election practice will be introduced at the next elections. They are aimed at carrying out further democratization, stepping up the influence of the masses on the activity of the organs of power, and also extending openness and the degree of voters' information on the work of the soviets. These changes come from life and reflect the nature of the changes which are taking place in society.

In selecting candidate deputies the opinion of public organizations not only in the workplace but also in place of residence will be considered. There will be more candidates living on the territory of a given electoral okrug and having a good knowledge of the problems of their own residential area.

As a rule, not just one -- as before -- but several possible candidacies will be examined for nomination.

The active participation of candidate deputies must be ensured in the whole election campaign. There must be as many live and informal meetings and conversations with voters as possible. The voter must really get to know his future deputy and trust him.

The upcoming elections will be an important milestone in expanding the process of democratization and shaping in Muscovites the sense of being the genuine master of their own city.

Openness must be stepped up in the activity of the soviets -- including via the press, television, and radio. Not just for information about what is being done, but also for real people's control of their own power. Lack of openness in the work of the soviets must be overcome, and businesslike cooperation between the soviets and the mass media must be expanded.

This interaction must be reciprocal. The ispolkom must take a tougher line against bureaucratic formalistic replies to criticism in the press organ of the gorkom and the Moscow Soviet. Journalists must raise more major problems of importance to the whole city, and not get bogged down in details and pursue one-day sensations.

Comrades! In the jubilee year of Soviet power, peoples' deputies and their elected and executive organs are called on to display to the maximum their inexhaustible potential. In its Appeal to the Soviet People published today, the party Central Committee stresses: Socioeconomic acceleration depends on the personal attitude to matters of every member of society and on how demandingly the voice of the worker conscience sounds in the collectives. Based on the best traditions, the Moscow Soviet can and must be raised to the level of really revolutionary actions and achieve a real improvement in working and living conditions in the capital -- which is what Muscovites expect of us with such impatience.

Life today insistently raises the question: "What have you done as a deputy for your voters?" None of us has the right to evade the answer, the responsibility, or real actions.

Gorkom Replaces Personnel

PM061307 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Mar 87 pp 1,3

[Unattributed report on 10th session of Moscow City Soviet, 19th Convocation, held 14 March at Moscow CPSU Gorkom and Obkom Political Education Center: "Democracy -- the Driving Force of Restructuring"]

[Excerpts] The 10th session of the Moscow City Soviet, 19th Convocation, was held yesterday at the Moscow CPSU Gorkom and Obkom Political Education Center.

The session was opened by Comrade V.T. Saykin, chairman of Moscow Gorispolkom.

Deputy Ye.K. Malkova, decorative repair expert at the main Administration for Consumer Services [Glavmosbyt] No 12 Sewn Goods Factory, was elected chairman of the session; and Deputy V.N. Vinogradov, rector of the I.M. Gubkin Institute of the petrochemical and Gas Industry, was elected secretary.

The Soviet approved the session's agenda.

1. Credentials of Moscow Soviet deputies elected 25 January 1987 for various electoral okrugs.
2. Organizational questions.
3. Report on the work of Moscow Gorispolkom during 1986 and the tasks involved in fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and USSR Council of Minister resolution "On Measures to Further Boost the Role and Increase the Responsibility of the Soviets for Accelerating Socioeconomic Development in the Light of the 27th CPSU Congress Decisions" (Keynote speaker V.T. Saykin).
4. Measures adopted by Glavmosbyt at the request of deputies at the ninth session of the Moscow Soviet.
5. Partial change in the boundaries of Zelenograd city.

Twenty-one deputies took part in the discussion of the report.

B.N. Yeltsin, first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom, addressed the session.

Taking part in the session's work were: B.P. Orlov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; T.N. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; N.I. Maslennikov, chairman of the RSFSR Gosplan; USSR and RSFSR ministers; and senior party and soviet organs personnel. [passage omitted]

The session examined organizational questions.

The Soviet elected Yu.M. Luzhkov first deputy chairman of Moscow Gorispolkom, releasing him from his duties as chairman of Moscow Soviet Standing Commission on Municipal and Consumer Services.

The Soviet released deputy B.V. Selivanov from his duties as deputy chairman of Moscow Gorispolkom and confirmed him as chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Main Administration for Capital Construction.

Deputy A.S. Matrosov was elected deputy chairman of Moscow Gorispolkom. In this connection he was released from his duties as chief of the Administration for Water and Sewage Services.

The Soviet released Deputy I.B. Bugayev from his duties as deputy chairman of Moscow gorispolkom and confirmed him as chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Main Administration for Culture.

The Soviet elected Deputy V.V. Menshikov deputy chairman of Moscow Gorispolkom, releasing him from his duties as chairman of Moscow Soviet Standing Commission on physical education and sport.

In connection with his retirement, Deputy V.V. Shiryayev was released from his duties as chairman of the city people's control committee and ispolkom member. Deputy P.Ye. Dikarev was appointed chairman of the City People's Control Committee. He was also elected a member of Moscow Gorispolkom.

Deputy G.N. Gavrilov was released from his duties as Moscow Gorispolkom member in connection with his retirement. Deputy G.V. Makarevich was released from his duties as Moscow Gorispolkom member and chief of the Main Administration for Architecture and Planning in connection with his retirement.

On the application of Deputy V.P. Shcherbakov, chairman of Moscow City Trades Union Council, his request to be relieved of his duties as member of Moscow Gorispolkom owing to heavy work commitments was granted.

Deputy P.S. Bogdanov, chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Main Administration for Internal Affairs, was elected a member of Moscow Gorispolkom.

The Soviet confirmed Ye.K. Kupreyev as chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Main Administration for Motor Transport.

Deputy V.I. Resin was released from his duties as chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Main Administration for Engineering Construction and confirmed as chief of Moscow Torispolkom Main Administration for Industrial Construction. Deputy G.N. Kaminskiy was released from this post in connection with his retirement.

In connection with his retirement the Soviet released Deputy B.A. Lifshits from his post as chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Main Highways Administration, and confirmed Deputy V.S. Sablin as chief of this main administration.

In connection with their transfer to other work, Deputy V.N. Voronenko was released from his duties as chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Main Administration for Capital Construction and Deputy V.I. Shadrin weas released from his duties as chief of the Main Administration for Culture.

The Soviet confirmed N.F. Brovkin as chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Archives Administration, releasing Deputy N.V. Voronov from this post in connection with his transfer to other work.

K.S. Danilin was confirmed as chief of Moscow Gorispolkom Administration for Accounting and Distribution of Housing.

The Soviet relieved V.P. Fedoseyev of the post of chief of Moscow Gorisopolkom Administration for City Presentation and Publicity.

The Soviet transformed the administration for consumer and municipal services and direct-sale tailoring and clothing repairs into the Glavmosbyt. Deputy V.V. Seleznev was confirmed as chief of the main administration.

In connection with their transfer to other work A.V. Surovtsev was released from his post as chief of the Consumer Services Administration and V.A. Komissarov was released from his post as chief of the administration for tailoring and clothing repairs.

The administration for water and sewage services was transformed into Moscow Gorispolkom Main Administration for the Exploitation and Construction of Water and Sewage Services (Glavmosvodokanal). S.V. Khramenkov was confirmed as chief of the main administration.

The Soviet released L.I. Lavrova from her duties as member of Moscow City Court in connection with her retirement. [passage omitted]

KOLBIN URGES PROSECUTORS TO MONITOR PARTY LEADERS

PM071215 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Mar 87 p 1, 2

[KAZTAG report: "Supporting the Inviolability of Legality and Law and Order: the Eighth Plenum's Work Goes On"]

[Excerpts] Measures to carry out the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum's requirements on strengthening legality and law and order and intensifying the protection of citizens' rights have been discussed at a conference of republic prosecution service personnel in Alma-Ata.

As G.B. Yelemisov, Kazakh SSR prosecutor general, noted in the report on this question, restructuring has heightened the struggle between the new and the old. Measures have been taken to determinedly combat the negative phenomena that have accumulated, above all favoritism, abuse of official position, drunkenness and alcoholism, unearned income, and drug addiction. The relevant coordinating councils set up within the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee and party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms have been giving truly invaluable assistance and cooperation in this matter.

It was stressed that the former leadership of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee pressured prosecution service organs to enable their relatives and friends who had committed criminal acts to avoid responsibility. That has now been stopped. With the support and help of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee and local party and soviet organs, the republic's law enforcement organs, including the prosecutor's office, can and must significantly improve their work to prevent and remedy breaches of legality, law, and order. [passage omitted]

G.V. Kolbin, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist party Central Committee, delivered the closing address.

The republic's press recently inaugurated a new rubric, "The Eighth Plenum's Work Goes On," he said, which contains materials developing the ideas, provisions, and conclusions voiced at the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee plenum. [paragraph continues]

We are thereby emphasizing that the broadest field of activity has now opened up before the republic party organization to instill order in literally every sphere: cadres, the political sphere, the socioeconomic sphere, the educational sphere, and so forth. There is much work to be done at many levels in order to meet the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum; it will take a long time.

What are we dealing with when we set ourselves the target of restructuring the activity of prosecution service personnel? The laws and the moral and ethical norms are the same for everyone in our society. Why do the demands of law enforcement organ personnel in putting them into practice sometimes differ? Why, as a rule, does it depend on the attitude of party leaders to those laws and norms? I shall cite just one example to clarify that: the high level of training of law enforcement organ personnel from the viewpoint of respect for party leaders and figures of authority within the party. This is a postive quality on the whole, and I am not exhorting you not to respect us now. That would surely be wrong, but your relations with party organs must contain the unalterable rule: The fulfillment of the laws is the prosecutor's sacred duty!

As far as I am concerned, the man I worked with in the Urals as party gorkom secretary will always be the model prosecutor. He was considered a cold man because he never socialized with anyone apart from his own family. He was always amiable but also always strict with himself. He could tell anyone, including the party gorkom first secretary, when they were acting incorrectly. He had a free hand and he had the power to question others. This, I believe, is the norm for a prosecutor, because he ought to be the most just of workers when it comes to the observance of the laws.

The prosecutor in the rayon, city, and oblast is the chairman of the coordinating council of law enforcement organs in the formulation of measures to forestall all criminal and other negative phenomena. The prosecutor, if you will, is the main "inspiration" in the search for the best ways to forestall the most typical crimes and other antisocial phenomena in a given population center or locality. He must make reasoned suggestions to his colleagues about measures needed to eradicate an evil.

Recently correspondents asked me: What is your cherished dream, what do you dream about? I am giving you the answer I gave them: I dream of happiness, happiness for everyone! The further restructuring progresses, the greater this sense of happiness will be for the broadest range of people.

To achieve that we shall not only have to improve the food supply and resolve the housing problem, we shall also have to assert justice in everything. A man can endure anything, any adversity and deprivation, if they are the same for all. If the norms of justice are violated, the greatest misunderstandings and sometimes even resentments will occur.

When work began in the republic to assert social justice and strengthen order and discipline, we at the Central Committee were inundated with letters. This flood of letters increased day by day because people were beginning to trust us more and more. The quantity of letters and people calling in has now abated somewhat. Why is this? because people can see that social justice is being asserted not just in words but in deeds.

More than one-half of the complaints are on housing problems. What measures are the republic organs and the Central Committee taking in this regard? [paragraph continues]

Mainly this means building more housing under the "Housing-91" program, it means openness in the distribution of housing, the ceremonial presentation of housing permits, and much else. Furthermore, we shall place obstacles in the way of those who try to obtain apartments by jumping the waiting line.

Second after the housing problem come complaints about violations of the norms of social justice by law enforcement organs. The question then arises: We are doing a lot to prevent manifestations of crime, to combat drunkenness, and to instill order, but what should we do to ensure that people do not doubt the fairness of the law enforcement organs? In my view, much here depends on prosecution service personnel. It is no secret that there have often been instances of interference by party leaders in investigations, as the main report and the speeches mentioned. We assessed these phenomena at the Eighth Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Plenum. We took organizational decision which even involved instituting criminal proceedings against culprits. We in the Central Committee have begun putting our own house in order. Several people have been expelled from the party and even arrested.

This should be a lesson to other party committees, too. They must also put their own houses in order and ensure that no party secretary assumes the role of chief arbiter, deciding whom to put on trial and whom to pardon. This right is reserved to the prosecutor and the corresponding administrative organ personnel. You must honor this right; it is your sacred duty! We must flatly rebuff the party leader who tries to show you his "technique" for conducting investigations or, for example, goes all out to level charges against someone.

The party's moral code contains the principle that failure to prove a charge should lead to acquittal. We should be guided by that principle, too.

We have begun to regulate the keeping of firearms. Such a large number of illegal guns have been brought in and surrendered! Some people had dozens of types of firearms, both registered and unregistered. When people were made strictly accountable, when they felt criminal proceedings would follow, they immediately began to surrender their weapons! Even people we did not suspect at all. Many leaders of party and soviet organs had permitted violations in this sphere and unlawfully demanded that rifles kept under licence be surrendered. They were.

This work is still not finished. The question must be asked bluntly: Who today still does not understand the law's firm demands on the keeping of firearms and hopes that ignorance of the law will serve as some defense. The law is the law and all must answer to it, be it the first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, the obkom, gorkom, or raykom, a Soviet leader, or some other leader.

Comrades, one fact bothers me. We were told to regulate the keeping of firearms, the machinery began to operate, results were achieved. We were told to regulate the use of "hunting" lodges, cottages, and residences -- we are doing so. We were not told to regulate the keeping of bladed weapons -- no one has begun to tackle this problem... The question then arises: Who ought to tell you to do all this? Why do you need to be prompted to act on the most elementary questions? Today, right now, let us begin working on the observance of the norms for keeping bladed weapons: No one is allowed to keep them. Let us begin with any party or Soviet leader of, say, oblast or city rank and ask if he has a "collection." We know such things exist!

Well, why doesn't the prosecutor go and drop a hint to his party leader, saying: "Esteemed Comrade, we are trying to put things in order, and, if your house is not in order, look into the problem yourself because when we call others to account they will point the finger at you." He will surely understand a hint like that! If he is "slow on the uptake," that means that he is in the party post fortuitously, with all the conclusions that are to be drawn from that. In brief, then, it is necessary to establish order while observing the ethical code and showing respect for the party or soviet organ.

The questions of relations among nationalities is interesting. At the eighth plenum we evaluated these phenomena in the following terms: There have been manifestations of nationalism but they occurred among a very narrow range of people, namely, extremists who incited young people with no firm "resistance" to such things yet. Those people have been found and measures have been taken against them, but they are criminal or party measures designed to deal with abuses. When it comes to finding out who organized these occurrences, we said we would investigate this and report to the next plenum. My question now is this: The next plenum is 4 months away and, if we really are dealing with just a small group of a couple of dozen extremists who "inflamed" a section of the young people while the great mass were unaffected by the manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, should we not use those 4 months to make our friendship stronger than it has ever been? Can we? (Applause) I am confident that we can! We are determining the ways to achieve that goal.

We put the question in these terms: The Central Committee Bureau, the Secretariat, and party committees shoud hear regular reports from institution and enterprise leaders on their organization of work in internationalist education. If disagreements do occur between different nationalities within the collective, then in the section of that leader's character report which usually says that he "possesses professional and political qualities" we shall point out that he does not possess political qualities. That will be correct, in my view! If he does not have the necessary political qualities, this means that he cannot be leader of a collective, either large or small.

Now let us take, for example, the leader of even the best enterprise and look at whether he is conducting the educational process in the national or international sphere or whether he is just working to fulfill the plan. Of course, he gives priority to the plan. His character report states that he possesses political qualities... To ensure success in the national conditions pertaining here -- and we must admit that they are acute among certain sections and categories of people -- we must all "pull together," so to speak. If we do not all work together to educate people and foster national sentiments and the control of those sentiments, we will not be able to instill order for long. If by the next plenum we ensure the proper agreement and understanding only at the top level, that is, if we here understand one another perfectly well but at grass roots level divisions persist among people of different nationalities, that is the wrong kind of friendship! Thus, our main task is to restructure work in the education of the broad masses.

I believe we shall find the right approaches. We must also be aware that when tackling questions connected with accountability to the law form the viewpoint of manifestations of criminal offenses, we must always sense and see those factors which unite nations and those which divide them. In this respect, too, we must be politicians, that is, we must be firmly confident that our character reports unfailingly record the presence of both professional and political qualities. I mean that we should not be timid or cautious in calling people to account for kindling national discord or for manifesting nationalism, but we should do it with a view to carrying out preventive work rather than punishment. More prevention! [paragraph continues]

Hence the rigid demand on all MVD, prosecution service, justice ministry, and court personnel to regularly report to workers' collectives on the work in progress and to make use of those reports to foster everything which brings people closer together.

In concluding my speech, Comrades, I have to say that we need to instill order in many areas. We should not be afraid of "powerful" people who have broken the laws. [Kolbin ends]

Taking part in the conference's work were N.A. Nazarbayev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, and V.I. Yefimov, chief of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Administrative Organs department.

PRAVDA ON ESTONIAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

PM071308 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 87 Second Edition p 2

[PRAVDA correspondent V. Shirokov report under the rubric "Communists Discuss the Decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum": "Estonia: No Hesitation"]

[Text] Tallinn -- Not Losing Ground [subhead]

Last year's economic growth rate was above plan in the republic. A hiccup in the first months of this year revealed the shakiness of what has been achieved. In all, 32 industrial enterprises failed to meet contracted deliveries of output. Quality indicators also deteriorated: More than R5 million went on paying various fines, penalties, and forfeits. Certain collectives are falling behind what had previously been achieved.

Neglecting a particular sector is not very clever, K. Vayno, first secretary of the Central Committee, said in his report at the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum. Complexities have a tendency to snowball. Unresolved questions build up one on top of another -- and problems arise which it then proves too costly to overcome. Nobody noticed when the strong farms began to give ground. Now almost nothing is heard about the Tazuya Kolkhoz in Raplaskiy Rayon. Even Tartu's V.I. Lenin Sovkhoz, once famous all over the republic, has now joined the ranks of the mediocre. Losing what was formerly gained is the most unforgivable thing.

The reasons for such miscalculations lie in the low standard of organizational and educational work of the party organizations and economic leaders and specialists. The state acceptance system has confirmed this once again. Since the beginning of the year much output has been returned to be put right. The Vyru gas analyzers plant found itself in a difficult position, having failed to meet the plan for handing over products for state acceptance in January-February. The party raykom should evidently share the responsibility for the mistakes with the plant's leaders and its party committee.

The paramount task for Estonia is the better utilization of the production potential which has been created in the countryside. In the last two 5-year plans the availability of fixed capital to the farms has almost doubled, yet the volume of output has increased by only 12 percent in that time. The means of intensification of the rural economy were discussed at the plenum by M. Oyluk, team leader at the Vinni demonstration sovkhoz and technical school, Yu. Niysuke, first secretary of Rakvereskiy party raykom, and others.

The speakers aimed "critical arrows" at the republican agro-industrial committee and the Central Committee agriculture and food industry department. With reason. In Estonia the collective and individual contract have not yet become the dominant forms, and the process of creating family farms has ground to a halt. The republic has been marking time in grain production for many years. Last year not much more than 1 million metric tons of grain was harvested.

How is a greater return to be obtained from the land? It is necessary, it was stated at the plenum, to introduce intensive techniques, learn persistently from the frontrunners, and use all the reserves for acceleration. The 9 May Kolkhoz has become the patron of the laggard Kiyr farm in Paydeskiy Rayon. This business cooperation has enabled Kiyr to emerge from the depths and increase the grain yield from 22 to 32 quintals. If only that happened everywhere!

The Effect of Social Concern [subhead]

People experience the fruits of the restructuring largely through the social sphere. New shoots have recently sprung up in services to the population. These include public catering centers operating on the basis of self-financing and financial autonomy. The first cooperatives have also opened in public catering. These immediately won popularity. Many consumer service experts are working on the basis of the team contract and contractual forms. Four so-called "home" [domashnyye] kindergartens have opened in Tallinn, and there are already 150 contract cab drivers.

Unfortunately, the new forms are being developed only in Tallinn. In other cities and rayons, they are getting away with promises as yet. The bureaucratic approach fetters initiative. V. Veskivyali, minister of local industry, speaks in favor of the tremendous significance of cooperatives in consumer goods production, but in practice nothing gets done.

There are still many complaints about transportation. The setting up of an organization which would concern itself with comprehensive transportation and dispatch services to the population has been discussed in various offices. The republic Ministry of Motor Transport and Highways has dragged out the decision for more than 18 months. Things only got moving after Minister G. Kruger had been given a severe warning at the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat.

In health care, the comprehensive system of medical examinations of the population, treatment at the patient's home, intensive care at general clinics, and other services are being introduced too slowly. Paid services are only poorly developed.

Many people's hopes of receiving new housing have not yet been fulfilled. Last year the republic failed to assimilate nearly R3 million, with which 300 apartments could have been built.

M. Anslan, deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, G. Tynspoyeg, chairman of the republic Gosplan, T. Kyukhkna, first deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR State Agro-Industrial Committee, L. Shmidt, minister of construction, and others were criticized at the plenum for shortcomings and flagrant blunders in the development of the social sphere.

Following the Guide of Democracy [subhead]

Life itself has made us turn toward the election of leaders, form a team leader to a director. [paragraph continues]

In Narva alone more than 2,000 captains of production have been elected by the labor collectives. Recently here, for the first time in the republic, the party gorkom first secretary was elected by secret ballot between two candidates. Similar elections were held in Tallinn's Leninskiy Raykom.

This is promising, V. Malkovskiy, secretary of Narva Gorkom, said at the plenum. It must be carefully controlled. Otherwise demagogues could prevail. That happened at one transport organization. The lovers of factionalism nominated a "convenient," complaisant man, and the primary party organization failed to show a properly principled approach. The "elected" man soon had to be removed because of the complete disruption of work.

The expansion of democracy and self-management and the development of criticism and self-criticism require a radical change in the work style on the part of party organizations and committees. Anyone who forgets this will reap difficulties. Here is an example. At the RET Association large-scale measure are being elaborated to improve the management structure and eliminate parallel underemployed subunits. A good, necessary initiative, but how is it being done? Basically the model for the new organizational structure was born in the plant management offices, without discussion the collective or comprehensive analysis of all its production and social consequences. Not even the secretaries of shop party organizations knew about it! As a result friction, complaints, and dissatisfaction arose.

Instances of a sharp reaction to criticism were cited from the plenum platform. For instance, an article in the evening newspaper on how to overcome monotony in the design of new housing developments had a hostile reception at the Tallinn housing construction combine. The leadership of the Russian drama theater launched a noisy anticriticism campaign over justified reviews in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA.

This shows that by no means everyone has grasped the spirit and revolutionary content of the times. Some people are still being overcautious and living by the old concepts. Although enterprising, energetic people have begun to be promoted into the republic's leadership. Since the 27th CPSU Congress nearly one-third of the party gorkom and raykom secretaries have been replaced, and three new chiefs of Estonian Communist Party Central Committee sections have been appointed. There have been marked changes in government and economic organs.

A fresh influx of forces should promote the harmonious combination of maturity and youth, experience and enthusiasm. This principle is not followed in practice everywhere. In the republic Ministry of Light Industry, for instance, the promotion of young workers is slow. Some 20 percent of enterprise directors are people of pensionable age. Yet suitable replacements are not being prepared. Sometimes there is a feverish search for candidates for a responsible post. Then there are hasty decisions. At the Kommunar Footwear Association, for instance, in the last 5 years there have been four different directors, one of whom lasted for only... 10 days.

The restructuring has highlighted the need to create an effective cadre reserve. So far there is no well thought out system in the republic for preparing this reserve. There must be particular concern for party organization secretaries. The primary organizations' activeness depends largely on the fighting qualities of those who head them. Take the leaders of rural party organizations. Only half are agricultural specialists, and a mere 15 percent have higher political education or are studying. One in ten does not live on the farm where carries out his duties.

The plenum participants approved the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum and outlined concrete measures to implement them.

OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON STATE ACCEPTANCE PROGRESS

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 10 Mar 87 p 1

[Interview with B. Sokolov, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Standards by V. Kovalenko: "Lessons of the First Stage"; first paragraph is source introduction -- Date and place of interview not given]

[Text] State acceptance has become a commanding part of our life. Let us not, however, overtake events -- is becoming. And by no means painlessly. The editorial mailbag contains many letters complaining about state acceptance officials and their excessive fault-finding. This is why I decided to begin the discussion with B. Sokolov, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Standards, with a question about personnel. Who are they, these people who have been given the right to prohibit the shipment of products and thereby directly influence the morale and material well-being of entire collectives.

[Sokolov] This question can certainly be answered in one word, specialists. We realized from the very outset that state acceptance work had potential for conflict by its objective nature.

This potential could be reduced by the high level of qualifications of the employees of the new service -- they would then be in a position to convincingly and cogently defend their position and, what is most important, would not be clutching at trifles but would immediately latch onto the essence and the main sore points. For this reason their pay is high -- in terms of earnings a state acceptance executive is on a par with an enterprise's chief engineer.

[Kovalenko] But most likely this has cost the state a kopeck or two? Altogether state acceptance employees constitute a sizable army of people, who produce nothing, but only evaluate the work of others.

[Sokolov] Yes, the content of state acceptance is, it may be said, pure overhead. But society is forced to go along with it because the losses which we are incurring today from the manufacture of substandard products are immeasurably greater.

I should, however, add that compensation is only a part of it. We have withdrawn from the production area people who are strong not only as specialists but also by their human attributes. And this also was a deliberate step -- we could not permit state acceptance to have engineers, even if they were very good, who did not know how to work with people. Therefore together with the party and soviet organs we carefully selected each nominee. And the personnel structure which has now taken shape here is perfectly logical: 30 percent of state acceptance executive were formerly enterprise chief specialists, almost the same percentage were technical supervision department chiefs, 26.5 percent were shop and other subdivision leaders, and the remainder were deputy directors and party and union officials. As you can see, we tried to select experienced people who had attended good schools. Approximately 80 percent of state acceptance employees worked prior to this at the same enterprises they are now monitoring.

[Kovalenko] Boris Nikolayevich, to be honest, I have difficulty believing this situation: You remove the best personnel from plants and the directors calmly look on. All this happened differently in practice, I would think?

[Sokolov] Well, of course, everything was more complicated. And it was particularly difficult during the first stage. Some managers adopted a fundamentally wrong position, endeavoring to give us frankly inadequate specialists, without whom the enterprises could manage very well. A further goal was being pursued here: inserting in state acceptance obliging people who would "not offend" their own people.

But I stress that all this was characteristic of the first stage. There was an abrupt turnabout following the November meeting in the CPSU Central Committee. The strong support of the party authorities and the press and television made it possible to lead the work into a normal channel of high scrupulousness. And we have now completed practically everywhere the formation of state acceptance services with skilled responsible specialists.

We do not consider work with the personnel completed, however. We have already dismissed eight state acceptance executives -- primarily for unscrupulousness. We will continue to take a look at other collectives, particularly those where a suspicious well-being has been detected -- at some plants state acceptance accepts 100 percent of the products the first time. This is not a reason in itself, of course, the level of surrender of products at first submission is now growing literally by the day. But it is necessary to investigate whether this is really the result of work that has been performed or the "loyalty" of the inspectors.

[Kovalenko] Many of our readers are worried that the plants will "crush" state acceptance when its activity begins to really threaten fulfillment of the plan and therefore believe that it is necessary to strictly and uncompromisingly insist on the document to the letter. Other letters, on the other hand, say that scrupulousness should be "realistic" -- take account of actual possibilities. Both are probably extremes. But where, then, lies the "golden" mean?

[Sokolov] Quality and the plan. This is the most serious problem today, perhaps. Back at the end of last year the managers of some enterprises had begun to talk about the fact that state acceptance was a good thing, but that you could not fulfill the plan with it. Indeed, none of those who came into conflict with it managed to escape quantitative losses. Talk about this was particularly pointed in the first half of January, when it had become clear that the majority of enterprises had been thrown off their customary schedule.

A precise investigation is needed here, however. State acceptance accepted in January all that was presented to it. Not all at once, many products only after additional work and the removal of complaints. But, then, a negligibly small amount was presented to it: in the first 10 days 5-10 percent of products, in the second, a further 15-20 percent, and the main stream surged forth in the last days of the month.

I do not believe that this happened deliberately, a whole number of objective factors was reflected, but a fact remains a fact: at the end of January state acceptance officials were put to a very considerable test of maturity and scrupulousness. How their relations with the enterprises in the future would take shape largely depended on whether or not they would give way under the pressure of this mass of products and the weight of reponsibility for the fate of the production outfit and its well-being. In the vast majority of cases our personnel emerged from this difficult situation with honor. In January enterprises were able to present and surrender to state acceptance only 83.9 percent of products. For industry this was, naturally, a serious lesson. And it was no accident that in the first 10 days of February we were presented with 23.9 percent of the monthly program -- alomost the normal cycle. The level of products accepted at first submission, rose to 86.9 percent.

[Kovalenko] Barring the way to defective work and deviations which may be put right immediately is only one part of it. The roots of many quality problems are deeply embedded--they could not be pulled out in a week or a month even. State acceptance employees are in an ambiguous position here: a product is functional, but does not correspond in all parameters to modern requirements. What about scrupulousness here?

[Sokolov] First of all, do not liken it to a telegraph pole. Scrupulousness not only admits of, but presupposes flexibility. I shall explain on the basis of a specific example.

We encountered the fact that USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy enterprises could not now supply tractor industry with 50G-steel rolled products for the track pins. We could, of course, have suspended the shipment of 50-steel rolled products, which were sent as a substitute. It would have been scrupulous in form, but essentially stupid because we would thereby have been stopping the tractor plants. Yet forcing the steelworkers to rectify the situation and having this done as quickly as possible, real scrupulousness would have been required for this.

Yes, we authorized the substitution. But, first, with the consent of the consumers and, second, the timeframe there of -- 6 months. During this period the steelworkers were obliged to assemble the necessary equipment and perfect the technology, in a word, to prepare fully for the manufacture of the rolled products expected of them. Simultaneously the price of their products was lowered, proceeding from the fact that as a result of the substitution the service life of the tracks had declined 10 percent. All other such situations should be tacked in approximately this way.

[Kovalenko] But what happens when the culprit -- the supplier of components -- is under the jurisdiction of "another's" department and is susceptible to no influence on the part of the consumer?

[Sokolov] Here also there exists quite a simple and practiced plan. Having discovered defective components or other deviations, state acceptance together with the technical supervision department of the enterprise lodges a complaint with the supplier and immediately notifies its colleagues monitoring the related subcontractors. If state acceptance has yet to be introduced there, the territorial bodies of the State Committee for Standards are brought in to the solution of the problem. They establish special terms for acceptance of the components, which are in effect until the reasons for the rejected products are removed.

That this plan works far from always is another matter. And here also precise investigation is needed.

In order for this entire complaints mechanism to operate efficiently we need, at a minimum, to have the source material. But what kind of source material is it, say, at the Voronezh Engineering Plant imeni V.I. Lenin if the Voronezh people receive approximately 500 items of some materials alone, and detailed to incoming control is... one woman.

The neglected state of incoming control is, unfortunately, a universal phenomenon. And not only incoming. At the Sumy Agricultural Engineering Plant, for example, the staff schedule in the technical supervision department provides for 60 persons, but in fact only 11 work there. And how to fill the vacant "units" if a technical supervision department inspector receives R133 per month, while the average worker's earnings are R215? These figures pertain to a different plant -- the Penza Compressor Plant -- it is true, but they correctly reflect the heart of the problem.

The most annoying thing is that all these questions, including that of wages, were resolved by the well-known CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree on quality. But some executives are in no hurry as yet to avail themselves of the opportunities granted them. And they frequently use the problem of unconscientious related subcontractors as a convenient screen. In any event practice testifies unequivocally: at the Vilnyus "Komunaras" Machine-Tool Plant, the Ryazan "Teplopribor," the Minsk Instrument Plant and many others which have involved themselves in earnest with quality and raised the prestige of the technical supervision department the problem of components is being tackled successfully.

[Kovalenko] Boris Nikolayevich, now is surely the time to ask the main question. Hitherto state acceptance has occupied itself mainly with bringing elementary order to bear -- it has put a barrier in the way of what must under no conditions pass through the gate of the enterprise. Today all is sufficiently precise and clear: this is white, that is black. But even now far from straightforward problems are arising. The same steelworkers could have been given 6 months for the right to substitute or could have been given 4. In addition, upon the expiry of this deadline it could be extended -- such tricks are, as you know, a widespread practice here. Will not state acceptance begin to "float" under these conditions? After all, its successful work, as you have shown convincingly in the example of related subcontractors, is possible within the workforce has already addressed quality. Will state acceptance have sufficient powers to resist the flywheel of inertia, which has been building up in recent years?

[Sokolov] Were it just a question of state acceptance alone, I would unhesitatingly say: no, it would not. But state acceptance cannot be viewed in isolation from the times in which we live and the events which have occurred and which have continued to take place since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and the 27th party congress. I would remind you just of recent ones -- the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum and the draft Law on State Enterprises. It follows with all indisputability from these documents that the reconstruction of the economic mechanism, the system of remuneration and personnel policy is most closely connected with the problem of quality. It is these revolutionary transformations in the economy which the workforce will have to develop and spin the flywheel in the right direction.

State acceptance also is in the same line of transformations. But not simply in the line -- it has been at the foremost edge of the struggle of the new against the old inasmuch as even today it concerns the interests of everyone -- from the worker through the director -- whereas the main levers of the reconstruction are only just being established, whence the seriousness and intensity of the passions are sometimes swelling beyond the framework of the permissible.

A big conflict, for example, arose at the Nikopol Crane Plant. The scrupulousness of state acceptance, which is headed by G. Osipov, was manifestly not to the liking of the enterprise managers. Convinced that there was no way they could "curb" the inspectors, they ventured upon an outright provocation: In flagrant violation of the CPSU rules a "case" was fabricated against Communist V. Volovik, senior state acceptance representative.

Our comrades stood their ground in this situation, and the party authorities of the city and the republic investigated it and put everything, as they say, in place.

These are isolated cases, of course. However, at no enterprise has the introduction of state acceptance gone smoothly, without clashes. Nor could it have done. It is important that in the overwhelming majority of cases our specialists have displayed not only scrupulousness but also forbearance and tact and shown that they are aware of the role that has fallen to them and perceive its inseparable connection with the reconstruction processes in the country. This is why I am convinced that the tasks set before state acceptance will undoubtedly be accomplished.

KVANT MODULE DOCKED; LINK-UP 'NOT COMPLETE'

LD090853 Moscow TASS in English 0849 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 9 TASS -- TASS correspondent reports from Mission Control centre:

The astrophysical module Kvant was docked with the Mir orbital station ot 4:36 a.m. Moscow time today.

The search, rendezvous, tethering and docking were controlled by automatic onboard systems and monitored by Mission Control in cooperation with the ground command and measurement system and also with Cosmonauts Yuriy Romanenko and Aleksandr Laveykin. The module was docked to the station on the side of the engine compartment.

The onboard systems of the module functioned normally at every stage of the rendezvous and docking. When mechanical contact between the docking units of the module and the station was achieved, the spacecraft began to be linked up. Analysis of telemetry information from the spacecraft indicated, however, that the link-up of the module and the orbital station is not complete.

Data received so far are being analyzed and decision on further operations with the module will be taken on the basis of the results of that analysis.

'INTERCOSMOS' PROGRAM VIEWED AT NEWS CONFERENCE

LD081200 Moscow TASS in English 1058 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS -- A meeting with Soviet and foreign newsmen, opened at the Soviet Foreign Minsitry Press Centre today, is devoted to the 20th anniversary of cooperation among socialist countries under the Intercosmos programme.

Academician Vladimir Kotelnikov, chairman of the Intercosmos Council, said that major projects and experiments directed at resolving the most important problems in the exploration of outer space had been carried out under the programme over the recent years.

23 Intercosmos satellites, 11 high-altitude Vertikal rockets and several hundred weather rockets of various modifications had been launched.

Nine flights by citizens from socialist countries on board Soviet spacecraft and stations were a fundamentally new stage in implementing the Intercosmos programme.

VII.	WESTERN EUROPE DAILY REPORT	Contents unchanged
VIII.	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA DAILY REPORT	Renamed; formerly SOUTH ASIA DAILY REPORT; contents include: International Affairs Inter-African Affairs Central Africa Burundi Cameroon Central African Republic Congo Equatorial Guinea Gabon Rwanda Sao Tome & Principe Zaire East Africa Djibouti Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Tanzania Uganda Indian Ocean Comoros Madagascar Mauritius Seychelles Southern Africa Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Namibia Republic of South Africa Reunion Swaziland Zambia Zimbabwe Western Africa Benin Burkina Faso Cape Verde Islands The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Ivory Coast Liberia Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo

Subscribers who wish to change their subscriptions should notify FBIS or NTIS by 1 May 1987 to ensure correct dissemination. Full subscription information is available on the DAILY REPORT back cover.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

This publication contains current news and commentary monitored by FBIS from foreign broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, and periodicals. Items are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign-language sources are translated by FBIS. Those from English-language sources are transcribed, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS. Labels such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how FBIS processed the information from the original. Names rendered phonetically or in transliteration by FBIS are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clearly heard, received, or published but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source.

Users of this publication may cite FBIS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying it as the secondary source. For example: "FBIS reports that Radio Moscow announced. . ." or "FBIS has monitored a broadcast from Hanoi which says. . . ."

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

The FBIS Daily Report is published Monday through Friday in 8 volumes: I – China, II – Eastern Europe, III – Soviet Union, IV – Asia and Pacific, V – Middle East and Africa, VI – Latin America, VII – Western Europe, and VIII – South Asia.

U.S. Government officials may obtain subscriptions to the Daily Reports at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. DOD consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 692-5753, Autovon: 222-5753.) For additional information or assistance call FBIS, (703) 527-2368, or write P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013.

The public may subscribe to either a hardcover or microfiche version of the Daily Report through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) of the Department of Commerce (5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161).

The annual subscription fee for the hardcover version within the United States, Canada, and Mexico is $290 for any one volume, $380 for two volumes, $450 for three, $540 for four, $625 for five, $715 for six, $800 for seven, and $890 for all eight volumes. This includes the occasional supplements to the Daily Report.

In microfiche (prepared weekly) the fee is $125 for any one volume, $155 for two volumes, $185 for three, $230 for four, $285 for five, $340 for six, $395 for seven, and $450 for all eight volumes. Foreign subscriptions outside North America are available from appointed foreign dealers or from NTIS.

Back issues or single copies of the Daily Reports are not available. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue of the Daily Report. Holders of subscriptions through NTIS should forward all inquiries, remittances, or changes in subscriber information to NTIS at the address listed in paragraph 3 or call: (703) 487-4630.

The publications of the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), which are sometimes cited in the Daily Report, may be ordered in single copies or by subscription from NTIS. In ordering, please cite the JPRS title, number, date, and author if applicable.

Both the Daily Report and JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at public and university libraries throughout the United States.